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CHAPTER 1
PROTECTING NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS: EXAMINING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
In 1872, Congress established Yellowstone National Park as a 
"public or pleasuring ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the 
people."* This legislation signaled the beginning of a new era in 
federal land policy. Federal land policy prior to 1872 is best de­
scribed as one of acquisition followed by disposal (see Tables 1-1 and 
1—2 ) By 1934, well over one billion acres of the public domain had 
been disposed of, including grants to states and railroads, script, 
purchase, preemption, and homesteading (see Tables 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3).
Even though Congress reserved Yellowstone in 1872, it was not 
until 1891 that reservation of land by the federal government became a 
major component of federal land policy. Specifically, the Forest 
Reserve Act, part of the General Revision Act of 1891, altered federal 
land policy by giving the president authority to withdraw forest land 
from the public domain in order to reserve an adequate supply of 
timber for future generations.3 The lands withdrawn under the Forest 
Reserve Act form the vast majority of the National Forest System. 
National Parks, Wildlife Refuges, and National Monuments have also 
been created out of the public domain.̂  Eventually, the public domain 
was closed to private acquisition with the passage of the Taylor 
Grazing Act of 1934. The grazing districts established by this act 
eventually became part of the Bureau of Land Management. While it is 
true that some small parcels of federal land have been disposed of 
during the last fifty years, the dominant policy has been one of
1
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Table 1-1
inquisition of Federal Lands, 1781-1867, in acres
Acquisition Land Water Total
State cessions 
(1781-1802)
233,415,680 3,409,920 236,825,600
Louisiana Purchase 
(1803)
523,446,400 6,465,280 529,911,680
Red River Basin 
(1818)
29,066,880 535,040 29,601,920
Cession from Spain 
(1819)
43,342,720 2,801,920 46,144,640
Oregon Compromise 
(1846)
180,644,480 2,741,760 183,386,240
Mexican Cession 
(1848)
334,479,360 4,201,600 338,680,960
Purchase from Texas 
(1850)
78,842,880 83,840 78,926,720
Gadsen Purchase 
(1853)
18,961,920 26,880 18,988,800
Alaska Purchase 
(1867)
362,516,480 12,787,200 375,303,680
TOTAL 1,804,716,800 33,053,440 1,837,770,240
Source: U.S. Department of Interior, Public Land Statistics
(Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 3.
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Table 1-2 
Important Federal Land Disposal Laws
Year Price Per Acre Size In Acres Conditions
1785
(Ordinance 
of 1785)
$1 minimum 640 minimum Cash sale; amended in 
1785 to provide for 
payment of one-third in 
cash, the remainder in 
three months.
1800 $2 minimum 320 minimum One-fourth of purchase 
price paid within 30 
days, then annual in­
stallments of one- 
fourth for three years 
at 6 percent interest.
1820 $1.25 minimum 80 minimum End of credit system; 
cash payment only.
1830 $1.25 minimum 160 maximum Squatters on public 
domain allowed to pur­
chase their tracts at 
the minimum price (pre­
emption) ; temporary 
act, had to be renewed 
biennially.
1841
(Preemption
Act)
$1.25 minimum 40 minimum; 
160 limit on 
preemption
Cash purchase only; estab­
lished right of premption, 
doing away with necessity 
of renewing legislation.
1862
(Homestead
Act)
Zero 160 maximum Payment of an entry fee 
and five years continuous 
residence; land could be 
preempted after six months 
residence for $1.25 per 
acre cash.
1873 
(Timber 
Culture Act)
Zero 160 maximum Cultivation of trees on 
one-quarter of a 160-acre 
required.
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Table 1-2 
Continued
Year Price Per Acre Size in Acres Conditions
1873 $1.25 640; reduced Required irrigation
(Desert Land within three years.
Act)
1909 Zero 320 Five year's residence with
Homesteading continuous cultiva-
Act) tions.
1916 Zero 640 Designed for land useful
only for grazing.
1934 --- -- Established grazing dis-
(Taylor tricts on the remaining
Grazing federal lands and closed
Act) the lands to private
settlement.
1976 
(Federal 
Land Policy 
and Management 
Act)
Reasserted the federal 
government's intent to 
retain ownership of fed­
eral lands.
Source: Lance E. Davis et al., American Economic Growth: An Economist's 
History the United States (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 104-105.
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Table 1-3
Land Owned by the United States as of Fiscal Year 1979, in acres
Agency and Bureau Public Domain Acquisition Total
Dept, of Agriculture: 
Forest Service 166,002,139.6 27,534,259.6 187,536,399.2
Dept, of Energy:
Energy KD Administration 627,182.0 701,758.3 1,328,940.3
Dept, of Interior:
Bureau of Land Management 
Fish & Wildlife Service 
National Park Service 
Bureau of Reclamation
395,155,545.5
38,686,169.8
61,547,222.6
4,684,991.6
2.367.290.0
4.468.836.0 
6,729,944.6
1.930.826.0
397,522,835.5
43,155,005.8
68,277,167.2
6,615,817.6
Tennessee Valley Authority ---- 988,872.0 988,872.0
Dept, of Defense: 
Air Force 
Army 
Navy
6.923.551.0
6.616.134.0 
1,976,127.9
1.378.443.0
4.054.084.0 
1,249,255.4
8,301,994.0
10,670,218.0
3,225,383.3
Corps of Engineers 658,984.4 7,575,504.6 8,234,489.0
All Other Agencies 980,200.6 1,085,973.5 2,066,171.1
TOTAL 677,858,245.0 60,065,047.0 738,290,906.5
Source: U.S. Department of Interior, Public Land Statisticsr pp. 10-12.
scientific management of federal land by federal bureaucracies. The 
government has also acquired a considerable amount of land for addition 
to the system of forests, grasslands, monuments, parks, and refuges.
Today the federal government owns over 700 million acres of land 
(approximately one-third of the total United States land area), and 
numerous federal agencies are involved in the management of natural 
resources (see Table 1-3). This shift in federal land policy (since 
the American Revolution) can be described as a shift from a policy of 
establishing private property rights to a policy of maintaining or 
establishing public rights to land. Though the reasons for this shift 
are varied and complex, one component is the view that the government 
(or state) is required for the protection of natural environments, 
such as parks and refuges. Today this view is the dominant (or con­
ventional) view held by bureaucrats, environmentalists, and most 
American citizens. In fact, one noted environmental historian, Rod­
erick Nash, has articulated the essence of this view by asserting the 
"fact that without formal (i.e. government) preservation the remaining 
American wilderness would vanish."5
Despite these attitudes (and resulting government policies), 
there is considerable evidence that questions the wisdom of this 
conventional view. In particular, there is evidence that the private 
sector does protect natural environments and that public management 
often degrades natural environments. The evidence below is presented 
to provide examples contrary to the traditional view of the role of 
the state in protecting natural environments.
7
Privately Protected Natural Environments 
The place to begin an examination of private sector protection of 
natural environments is perhaps Great Britain, where the modern pri­
vate property-market economy originated. In English law there is 
precedent for private ownership of wildlife in reference to such 
"royal species" as the swan and the whale owned by the English king.® 
(The current extent of privately owned wildlife in England is not a 
subject of study examined in this paper.) Private rights to water 
also has precedent in English law. In Pollution. Property and EtlCSSf 
Dales described the British system of property rights to water with 
respect to pollution control and stream quality. He found that pro­
perty rights to fresh water fisheries were well-defined and enforced 
through the Gommon Law.̂  For decades, centuries in some cases, water 
use allocation has been through private (market) transactions. In the 
United States, however, private ownership of wildlife or instream 
water is still not considered a legal possibility.
While my research suggests that much of the natural environment 
protection in the private sector is relatively recent (within the last 
25 years), there were private sector responses as early as the late 
1800s. Tober reported that farmers in Pennsylvania began leasing
ptheir land to sportsmen's association for hunting as early as 1877. 
Tober also described the establishment of private game preserves that 
began in Pennsylvania in 1871 and were designed after their European 
counterparts.̂  Initial membership fees for the first game preserve- 
shooting club were $450 (approximately $4,000 in 1983 dollars); today, 
memberships to similar waterfowl clubs in California's Sacramento 
Valley are as high as $65,000.-*-® Tober found that by 1894 "thirty-two
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clubs controlled 824f112 acres" in the Adirondack Mountains of New 
York state.** Similar private preserves were being established else­
where. In Tober's words, "Principal coastal preserves were found at 
the south shore of Long Island, the upper Chesapeake Bay, tidewater 
Virginia, the Currituck Sound, and the Suisan marshes of California; 
inland preserves were maintained along the Illinois, lower Missis­
sippi, Sacramento, and San Juaquin rivers and at Michigan's St. Clair 
Flats."*2
There are also cases of private sector wilderness preservation 
prior to the modern environmental movement. John D. Rockefeller 
purchased 30,000 acres in the Jackson Hole Valley of Wyoming and 
deeded them to the federal government, providing land for the bulk of 
Grand Teton National Park.** Rockefeller's family also provided core 
lands for the Great Smokie's National Park and Acadia National Park 
(see Appendix A). Percival P. Baxter, one-time governor of Maine, 
donated a 200,000-acre preserve containing Mt. Katahdin (Maine's tallest 
peak) to the state as a wilderness park now known as Baxter State 
Park.14
In addition to these early private sector efforts there has been 
a considerable amount of privately protected natural environments in 
recent times (see Appendices B and C). Private nonprofit conservation 
organizations have protected over 6 million acres through outright 
land ownership as well as through lease and easement contracts (see 
Appendix B). Profit-seeking institutions are protecting natural 
environments by providing such goods and services as stream reclamation, 
hunting and fishing access, wildlife habitat, outdoor recreation, and
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recreation management (see Appendix C). In addition, many firms use 
easements or covenants to maintain or enhance environmental quality on 
or adjacent to their development projects. Below are two examples of 
privately protected natural environments. The first example is the 
Cross Ranch (North Dakota) and the second is the International Paper 
Company. The Cross Ranch example will illustrate how a nonprofit 
organization protects natural environments. The International Paper 
Company example will show how a profit-seeking firm is able to benefit 
from protecting such natural environments as wildlife habitat, recrea­
tional lands, and scenic-amenity areas.
Example: The Cross Ranch
The 10,000-acre Cross Ranch in North Dakota fronts the 
Missouri River along its west bank roughly 30 miles northwest of 
Bismarck. From a natural flood plain flanking the river, the 
land rises through terraces and eroded breaks into rolling upland 
prairies that are virtually treeless. The trees are to be found 
along the river and in woody draws among the breaks.15
This central North Dakota ranch was established during the 1880s 
by A.D. Gaines, a former professor of classical languages at the 
University of Minnesota and a land agent for the Northern Pacific 
Railroad.1  ̂ In 1926, Gaines' son, Bert, took over the ranch. It was 
Bert Gaines who acquired Theodore Roosevelt's Maltese Cross brand and 
named the ranch Cross Ranch. Thirty years after Bert Gaines took over 
the ranch, he sold it to Robert Levis, an Alton, Illinois, business- 
man-farmer. In January 1982, The Nature Conservancy purchased the 
Cross Ranch for $2.7 million for the purpose of preserving the ranch's 
unique heritage. The Nature Conservancy is a private nonprofit conser-
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vation organization established to preserve natural areas. Since its 
inception in 1950r The Nature Conservancy has preserved over 2.8 
million acres through purchase, easement, and assistance to government 
agencies.17 The Cross Ranch is but one small example of the 
Conservancy’s preservation efforts.
The last individual owner, Robert Levis, sought to preserve the 
ecological, archaeological, and historical values of the Cross Ranch 
and had offered the ranch for sale (below market price) to the state 
of North Dakota as a state park. In 1979, the state legislature 
approved funds to purchase the ranch from Mr. Levis. However, in 
September 1980, North Dakota voters defeated this legislation in a 
statewide referendum. After this vote, The Nature Conservancy became 
involved in an effort to purchase the ranch from Levis who still 
desired to preserve the ranch. Upon purchase of the ranch, Levis 
agreed to provide The Nature Conservancy with $1 million for long-term 
management funds. In fourteen months, $1.5 million was raised from 
corporations, foundations, and individuals.
The fact that The Nature Conservancy was unable to raise all of 
the $2.7 million forced them to reconsider their original intentions 
of preserving 7,000 acres of the 10,000-acre ranch. Current plans to 
are to sell 4,600 acres and only preserve the remaining 5,400 acres as 
a natural area. During the summer of 1982, 1,300 acres of cultivated 
land were leased for farming, pending a more favorable market for land 
sale. In order to insure land use that was compatible with natural 
area management, Hie Nature Conservancy restricted the uses of the 
ranch land it sold to those compatible with the rest of the preserve
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(see Appendix D). For example, Hie Nature Conservancy reserved all 
mineral rights to the land for sale and restricted land use to agri­
cultural and grazing only. In addition, they reserved the right to 
approve any residential or commercial construction on the land as well 
as access and excavation rights for any archaeological research that 
would not "unreasonably interfere with the buyer's agricultural use of 
the property."
Currently, the Cross Ranch is being managed to preserve Missouri 
River bottomland, Indian archaeological sites, the frontier town of 
Hensler, North Dakota, and the prairie wildlife. The ranch is open to 
the public at no charge, and a live-on manager oversees the operation 
of the preserve. Hiking and fishing are allowed; archeaological 
studies continue; grazing is used as a management tool and a revenue 
source; and fire and hunting are planned as potential management tools 
to enhance the environment. As such, the ranch is an example of how 
private nonprofit conservation organizations protect natural environ­
ments.
Example: International Paper Company-*-®
Hie International Paper Company (IP) is a major industrial forest 
corporation and the largest private landowner in the United States.
IP owns approximately 7 million acres of forestland: 5 million in the 
Southeast, 1 1/2 million in the Northeast, and 1/2 million in the 
Pacific Northwest. IP has annual sales of approximately S5 billion 
and is considered a very successful enterprise. In addition, IP has
12
developed an extensive and profitable wildlife and recreation manage­
ment program.
Since the 1950s, IP has earned revenue through the sale of hunt­
ing leases. Much of their land is leased to hunting clubs? in recent 
years, the total has been 1.65 million acres at an average price of 
$.83 per acre annually.1-9 The bulk of the research and planning work 
for IP's wildlife programs is conducted at the company's 16,000-acre 
Southlands Experiment Forest located near Bainbridge, Georgia. The 
forest was established in 1957 to investigate the potential of profit­
able wildlife management. Today, IP employs five specialists with 
M.S. degrees in wildlife biology who oversee wildlife and recreation 
on all of IP's land except those holdings in the Pacific Northwest. 
Research at Southland is primarily concerned with the development of 
forest management practices that enhance wildlife populations as well 
as profitability.
Because game animals are typically more valuable than nongame 
species, most of the research and management is directed at such 
species as turkey, pheasant, quail, waterfowl, and whitetailed deer. 
However, IP research foresters have conducted valuable research on 
such nongame fauna as bluebirds and gopher tortoises. One current and 
major study involves radio-tracking wild turkeys in Alabama. IP's 
wildlife research has become increasingly accepted in the scientific 
community and has produced benefits beyond those that can be captured 
by the company. In fact, IP currently commits more acreage to managed 
wildlife production than any single state game agency in the United 
States.
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Leasing land to hunting clubs is but one of several wildlife 
management schemes IP uses. Some land is leased to state agencies for 
wildlife management; some is open for day hunting permits by species 
(individual permits on non-club land has averaged $.62 per acre annu­
ally); and some of the land with little hunting demand is simply open 
to public hunting at no charge. IP also allows fishing on much of its 
land and leases fishing rights in areas where it has control of an 
entire lake; to date, however, revenue from fishing leases has been 
insignificant. In conjunction with its wildlife program, IP also is 
involved with such outdoor recreation projects as nature trails and 
canoe areas; currently, IP charges nothing for the use of these fa­
cilities and views them primarily as good public relations policy.
Another aspect of IP's management policy that is important for 
this paper is its cooperation with nonprofit conservation organiza­
tions to preserve natural areas. IP has worked with Hie Nature Con­
servancy and numerous local conservation organizations to preserve 
areas of unique ecological and geological value. IP has aided these 
groups by both selling and donating land. Because such actions are 
considered charitable gifts, there are often significant tax advan­
tages in moving land into a protective use type. International Paper 
Company, by utilizing a variety of management tools and contractual 
arrangements, is an example of how profit-seeking firms can prosper 
from the protection of natural areas.
Public Failures In Protecting Natural Environments
While the evidence that shows the private sector to be successfully 
protecting natural environments has been growing, so has the evidence that
shows that the public sector has degraded natural environments. As 
previously mentioned, reservation and bureaucratic management of the 
public domain originated largely as a response to the nature of free 
enterprise, which was often perceived as rapacious and short-sighted, 
especially with regard to forest resources. Bernard Fernow, for 
example, a professional forester in the Division of Forestry (the 
precursor of the Forest Service) and author of Economics q£ Forestry, 
wrote:
We will see, that the forest resource is one which, under 
the active competition of private enterprise, is apt to deteri­
orate, and its deterioration to affect other conditions of mate­
rial existence unfavorably; that the maintenance of continued 
supplies as well as of favorable conditions is possible only 
under the supervision of permanent institutions with whom present 
profit is not the motive. It calls pre-eminently for the exer­
cise of the providential functions of the state to counter-act 
the destructive tendencies of private exploitation.20
Fernow was associated with what has been termed the "progressive 
conservation movement," along with such men as Theodore Roosevelt and 
Gifford Pinchot.2-̂ Conservationists in the progressive tradition 
criticized the private management of natural resources and were in­
strumental in establish policies that reserved land for public manage­
ment.22 Scholars of American history have typically subscribed to the 
view that the progressive conservation movement was the beginning of a 
long overdue change in federal natural resource policy.2̂  Roy M. 
Robbins, a noted public land historian, summarized the conventional 
historical view:
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No nation in the world had so wasted its natural 
resources or opened up its natural treasure to unbridled 
exploitation as had the United States of America. But a halt 
had been called. The grizzled, hardheaded pioneer of the 
American West and the ever-grasping corporation stood face to 
face with the challenge of a new American order which demanded 
an end to the reckless and wasteful methods of the era of 
laissez-faire. The task which remained was not only to recover 
lost ground, and to preserve the fragments that were left, but 
also to educate the public on the intelligent use of the remain­
ing resources. This was a herculean task. Already the best of 
forest lands had been acquired, by fair means and foul, and the 
nation’s rights in these resources reduced to a minute percent. 
In fact, many authorities thought that it was already too late. 
But governmental authorities insisted that there was still 
much good land left* and that immediate steps should be taken 
for its protection.24
Recent developments in the economics literature, however, suggest 
that many of the assertions made by progressive conservationists and 
their contemporaries are, in fact, not well-founded. For example, 
Libecap and Johnson found, contrary to the views of conservationists, 
that "costly Federal land policy encouraged fraud and theft" in American 
forests.2  ̂ They noted that conservationists based many of their 
arguments for establishing a forest reserve system on timber fraud and 
theft, especially in the Pacific Northwest. Because government policy 
ignored the economies of scale involved in logging operations by 
legally restricting private land claims to 160 acres, timber men 
allocated a substantial amount of valuable resources to skirting the 
law ("fraud") in order to establish property rights to tracts of 
timber that were large enough to be economically viable. Libecap and 
Johnson document the activities of so-called "entry men" who were 
agents employed by timber companies to legally establish rights to 
land and then turn them over to their employer for a fee. Since the 
costs of "fraud" were real and significant, "the value of the land had
16
Ofito be more than double the figure had there been no restrictions. ° 
These costs, in essence, postponed the establishment of property 
rights and prolonged the period of common property, and this "delay 
contributed to the very timber theft that was used by conservationists 
to justify the creation of National Forests."2̂  Libecap and Johnson 
further pointed out that "ironically, fraudulent activity which hastened 
the transfer of land from the public domain to the private sector 
reduced the frequency of timber theft." In addition, Libecap and 
Johnson found that "timber companies were not rapidly cutting their 
holdings" and that Gifford Pinchot (the first U.S. Forest Service 
chief) actually criticized timber owners for not producing.
In a later article, Johnson and Libecap examined market effi­
ciency with respect to the harvest of timber in the Great Lakes region 
(Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) during the last half of the 19th 
century.28 In examining the allegation made by early conservationists 
that markets were unable to account for increasing resource scarcity 
and that profit-seeking timbermen would ultimately exhaust their re­
source, Johnson and Libecap found that "the [timber] market not only 
operated in a manner consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, 
but that future demand and supply conditions for lumber were estimated 
accurately." Their examination of lumber and stumpage prices indi­
cates that the market adjusted smoothly to changing resource values 
and inventories and that nc major price shocks existed that would 
indicate a sudden realization that timber was a finite resource. 
Timbermen, in fact, harvested with prices (a measure of relative 
scarcity) in mind.
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Johnson and Libecap further found that timber theft in the Great 
Lakes region was negligible and that property rights were established 
prior to major harvest operations. They also found that speculators 
held virgin old-growth timber off the market for as long as 20 years 
in expectation of stumpage price increases. They also refuted the 
allegation that rapid timber harvest led to mass flooding in the Great 
Lakes region; evidence supporting this claim was not found. While 
conservationists were alarmed that early timber harvest was exceeding 
the timber growth rate# Johnson and Libecap pointed out that "wealth 
maximization does not# in general# imply that growth should equal cut 
except at some steady state solution." In fact# downward inventory 
adjustment is quite rational with large stocks such as those faced by 
timbermen during the 19th century. In short# the Johnson and Libecap 
study indicated that when property rights are secure# markets "develop 
early and effectively to allocate resources over space and time."
In another study# Berck analyzed the assertion that private 
timber owners have overharvested their forests with regard to the 
socially optimal level.^  in his examination of timber harvest rates 
in the Douglas fir industry# Berck found "that private entrepreneurs 
holding rational expectations with respect to future prices have 
historically been discounting the future at a real rate of 5 percent—  
a much lower rate than that available for other private investments—  
and# therefore# that these owners have not cut their forests prema­
turely." Berck's findings contradict the allegations of timber famine 
that have been common since the days of Gifford Pinchot. It is also 
worth noting that the timber market (which has been largely free of
18
price controls) where prices have risen much faster than the cor­
responding prices of crude oil has not brought the nation to its knees 
with a "timber crisis" (see Table 1-4).
With regard to range management, Libecap's Locking Up ihe £ang£» 
an analysis of federal range land controls, pointed to the insecure 
nature of property rights to the range as the cause of many range
onmanagement problems, such as overstocking and under investment.^ 
Libecap also noted that restrictive federal range policy increased the 
costs of establishing property rights and hence prolonging the over- 
grazing problem associated with the common property ownership. While 
overgrazing problems on the range can be largely attributed to common 
ownership during the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th 
century, the problem of underinvestment in fencing, water storage, and 
so forth can be largely attributed to the tenuous nature of property 
rights subjected to the fluctuating politics of bureaucratic manage­
ment. Libecap's study suggested that market allocation has not been 
the cause of range conservation problems, but rather the insecurity of 
property rights to the range has often prevented markets from moving 
resources to their highest valued uses.
Since John Wesley Powell's exploration of the American Southwest 
in 1869, there has been concern over the development and conservation 
of water resources in the arid Western states. Powell strongly urged 
the government to actively involve itself in the "reclamation" of the 
West.-** Along with other progressives, Powell felt that the private 
sector could not muster the capital required for necessary water 
development and that water monopolies would dominate the region; only
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Table 1-4
Comparison of Timber and Petroleum Prices, 1945-1980
Year
(Stumpage 
In $/1000 Board Ft.) 
Douglas Fir
(Avg. Value at 
Well Per Barrel) 
Crude Petroleum
1945 $ 5.00 $ 1.22
1946 6.60 1.41
1947 9.90 1.93
1948 19.90 2.60
1949 11.10 2.54
1950 16.40 2.51
1951 25.40 2.53
1952 25.80 2.53
1953 20.20 2.68
1954 16.20 2.77
1955 28.90 2.77
1956 37.70 2.79
1957 26.20 3.09
1958 21.80 3.01
1959 36.80 2.90
1960 32.00 2.88
1961 27.60 2.89
1962 24.80 2.90
1963 27.90 2.89
1964 38.10 2.88
1965 42.60 2.86
1966 50.00 2.88
1967 41.70 2.92
1968 61.20 2.94
1969 82.20 3.09
1970 41.90 3.18
1971 49.00 3.39
1972 71.70 3.39
1973 138.10 3.89
1974 202.40 6.74
1975 169.50 7.67
1976 176.20 8.14
1977 225.90 8.57
1978 250.30 8.96
1979 394.40 12.64
1980 432.20 21.19
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics Qt the United 
States» Colonial Times 1970, bicentennial ed., part 1 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 547 , 593; idem, Statistical Abstract 
fit the U«S.» 1981. 102d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1981), pp. 706, 723.
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through federally funded projects could adequate and equitable water 
resource development take place. The passage of the New land's Reclama­
tion Act in 1902 established the Bureau of Reclamation (originally
i
named the Reclamation Service) and firmly involved the federal govern­
ment in the water development business. Research by Anderson, how­
ever, suggests that the market system was falsely accused of being 
unable to handle the allocation of water for irrigation and municipal 
uses.32
Anderson documented the evolution of the prior appropriation 
doctrine, which established transferable rights to consumptive water 
use, and the scope of private water development. Anderson found pri­
vate water development for irrigation and municipal uses to exist in 
significant amounts prior to the advent of widespread government 
involvement in water projects.33 .By 1890, there were already 3.6 
million acres of Western land with privately developed water re­
sources. Anderson's research suggests that the progressive's concern 
for adequate water development in the West via markets was largely 
unwarranted and that the concern of Powell et al. with water monopoly 
"has little empirical basis."34
The evidence presented above contradicts the traditional view 
that the private sector was wasteful and inefficient in its allocation 
of natural resources. In addition to this evidence, there has been 
considerable research indicating that public management of natural 
resources has often been inefficient and degrading to natural environ­
ments. One of the ways this inefficiency manifests itself is in the 
establishment of physical output maximization rules for resource
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management.^ In contrast to an economic decision rule, which 
attempts to maximize net discounted present value (NDFV), physical 
maximization rules seek to maximize such things as board feet of 
timber or animal unit months of forage production. As such, these 
physical maximization rules ignore costs, interest rates, and net 
revenue. Because these factors are not calculated into the decision 
making process, site specific investment is often suboptimal. For 
example, on national forest lands, low quality timber growing sites 
are often harvested at a net economic loss, while superior sites often 
receive less investment than is optimal.
Numerous studies have documented the inefficient management of 
public resources. Clawson has estimated that the U.S. Forest Service 
was operating at an annual loss in 1974 of approximately $2 billion, 
even when inputed values for non-market goods (recreation, wildlife, 
etc.) were valued generously.®® More important for this paper is the 
fact that such inefficiency has often led to the degradation of na­
tural environments.®7 Much of the research in this area has focused 
on the Forest Service. Hyde, for example, found that 3.2 million 
acres of public forest land in the Pacific Northwest were allocated to 
timber production despite the fact that these lands were unprofitable 
for timber production.®® Hyde showed that the region's recreational- 
wilderness land base could be tripled if efficient forest management 
was practiced.
Hyde conducted a similar analysis of the San Juan National Forest
OQin Colorado, where wilderness and recreational use is very high. 
Despite the high value of the forest as an amenity resource, the
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Forest Service was expanding an already marginal timber program into 
419,000 acres of roadless areas where roading costs alone exceeded the 
stumpage value of the timber. More recently, Sample found that total 
timber management costs for the San Juan National Forest in fiscal 
year 1981 were $3,479,595 while timber receipts were only $461,158.40. 
Translated into dollars per thousand board feet (mbf), costs were 
$79.63 and receipts were $10.55} costs did not include reduced recrea- 
tion-wildemess values due to lumbering activities. The work of 
Barlow et al. supports the analyses by Clawson, Hyde, and Sample.41 
In the Tongass National Forest (Alaska), Barlow found that in recent 
years the Forest Service lost over $10 million annually, largely 
because of the agency's original miscalculation of the standing timber 
inventory.42 Despite this, Tongass forest planners have called for 
increased harvest during the next decade. Barlow estimated that annual 
costs for these planned harvests will be aproximately $80 per mbf 
while receipts will average $25 per mbf annually.
All of these studies suggest that National Forest managers have 
degraded natural environments by expanding timber harvest programs 
into areas that are more highly valued for recreational-wilderness 
use. Hyde, for example, summarized his San Juan study by stating that
wilderness values would be better preserved on this land if 
it were privately owned, because no profit-oriented owner 
would bother to cut down the trees. This is a somewhat para­
doxical conclusion, since profit-seeking is frequently 
thought of as leading to environmental degradation, which 
must in turn be mitigated by government regulation.
Similar conclusions have been drawn by researchers who have studied 
other publicly managed natural resources. Lanner found that the
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Forest Service and the Bureau of land Management (BLM) have "chained" 
vast acreages of pinyon-juniper woodland at an economic loss.44 
Chaining, a range management tool in which crawler tractors drag log 
chains over the ground to remove small trees in order to encourage 
forage production, is not only environmentally degrading but it fails 
to pass a standard benefit-cost test. Lanner reported that nearly 3 
million acres were chained frpm 1950 to 1964; from 1960 to 1972 the 
BLM chained over 250,000 acres in Utah alone.
Other studies have shown that public agencies often subsidize 
development of natural environments through loans, grants, and insur­
ance programs, as well as through publicly funded development pro­
jects. A few examples are found below. On the Navajo Indian Reserva­
tion, tribal officials and federal agents (with the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs) have institutionalized common property grazing practices that 
have led to overgrazing on the range.4̂  Nearly twenty different 
federal agencies are involved in subsidizing the development and 
redevelopment of the nation's system of coastal barrier islands.46 
For over three generations, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army 
Corps of Engineers have been building dams, channelizing streams, and 
draining wetlands; in the process, natural environments have been 
degraded by programs that often lack net economic justification.4̂  
Federal energy policy, by controlling prices and subsidizing costly 
projects, has artificially induced increases in energy demand, de­
graded natural environments, and hindered the development of alterna­
tive energy sources.4® Wildlife populations, such as the grizzly 
bear, have also suffered from public management objectives.4^
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objectives and Organization
The evidence presented in the last two sections contradicts the 
conventional view that public ownership or management of natural 
resources is required for the protection of natural environments. 
Specifically, there is considerable evidence that the private sector 
often protects natural environments and that the public sector often 
degrades these areas. The purpose of this professional paper is to 
examine the economic logic behind this fact. Why do private institu­
tions protect natural environments in certain cases and why do public 
institutions degrade them in certain cases? In the next three chap­
ters, I will apply existing economic theory to these questions. From 
the start it is assumed that the evidence presented above is amenable 
to such analysis and is not simply a gathering of chaotic and coinci­
dental events.
Before beginning the analysis, it is useful to clarify some of 
the terminology that will be used in this paper. "Natural environ­
ments" is taken to mean any natural resource valued for its amenity, 
recreational, wildlife, or wildland values. This would include scenic 
areas, wildlife habitat, open space, and wilderness backcountry. The 
term "natural areas" will be used synonymously with natural environ­
ments. A distinction between "public" and "private" should also be 
made. "Private" and "private sector" refer to any nongovernmental 
institution, that is any institution that receives revenue voluntarily 
and has no monopoly on coercive police power. "Public" or "public 
sector" is the converse? such institutions receive revenue through
25
such involuntary means as taxation and are backed by coercive police 
power. "State" will be used synonymously with "government."
This professional paper will be organized in the following manner: 
Chapter 2 will examine the economic rationale for both public and 
private protection of natural environments. The case for public 
protection will rest on traditional market failure analysis, while the 
case for private protection will be based on the paradigm of the "New 
Resource Economics." Chapter 3 will be an economic analysis of pri­
vately protected natural environments and will emphasize the property 
rights paradigm within neoclassical economics. The final chapter will 
be an examination of the mechanisms of private protection and an 
application of the property rights theory (described in Chapter 3) to 
the evidence shown above. Chapter 4 will also include a section on 
alternative institutional arrangements that might further enhance the 
ability of the private sector to protect natural environments.
A few remarks concerning an economic perspective of natural 
resources is in order. First, economics as a social science is con­
cerned with value, not money, profit, or physical output. Likewise, a 
developing, changing economy means that resources are continually 
being moved to higher valued uses whether these new uses are steel 
beams, computers, or wildlife preserves. In fact, it is the entrepre­
neur, by finding higher valued uses for resources, who provides eco­
nomic development and essentially provides society with a "free 
lunch." Economic development or growth does not simply mean more cars 
or more subdivisions. The most efficient economic system is one that
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produces the most value for society's individuals from the available 
resources. It must be realized that value is of a subjective nature. 
Some people value the Rocky Mountains for their beauty and wilderness, 
some for their timber or minerals. (Actually, most people value them 
for all of these goods, although they do so to varying degrees.) An 
economist is in no position to distinguish which of these values are 
morally superior to the others. His analysis can only show that the 
values exist (in the form of demands) and that different institutions 
will allocate resources in ways that can change the total value de­
rived from those resources.
In this professional paper, a key question implicit in much of 
the text will be: How does one create institutions that allow the
public sector to protect natural environments with legitimate public 
good characteristics without undermining the ability of the private 
sector to do the same and without creating an environment conducive to 
resource-wasting political bargaining? This question is essentially 
what three economic historians have called the "basic dilemma of 
political economy."^ Hie analysis put forth in this paper is an 
attempt to solve one aspect of this "dilemma."
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CHAPTER 2
ECONOMICS AND THE LOGIC BEHIND PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS
Both public and private institutions have been used to protect 
natural environments. The evidence presented in Chapter 1 suggests 
that private institutions have performed better than expected and that 
public institutions have performed worse than expected. In this 
chapter, I will examine why this has been the case; concurrently, I 
will examine the economic rationale for establishing both public and 
private institutions to protect natural areas.
Market Failure; The Case for Public Institutions 
Within the context of economic theory, most of the goods and 
services associated with protection of natural environments (wildlife 
habitat, scenic vistas, and wilderness) have been analyzed via the 
theory of market failure. More specifically, market failure regarding 
natural environments typically focuses on the problems of externality, 
public goods, and common property. The problem of monopoly, although 
an acknowledged market failure problem, is of little importance in the 
natural resource matters addressed in this professional paper. The 
following section will examine the three components of market failure 
with respect to the protection of natural areas. When markets fail to 
efficiently allocate resources, economists have suggested that public 
institutions be established to allocate those resources in an effi­
cient manner.
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Externality
Externalities (or spillovers) have been the overwhelming argument 
for government intervention in a market economy. Externalities occur, 
and they may be "positive" or "negative" when all of the impacts of 
economic activity are not born by the decision maker.1 When either 
type of externality occurs, production will deviate from the social 
optimum. Externalities exist precisely because private costs and 
benefits are not equated with social costs and benefits.
"Negative" externalities arise when the marginal social costs 
(MSC) of some activity exceeds the marginal private cost (MPC) (see 
Figure 2-1). In such a case, private output (Qp) is greater than 
prescribed by economic efficiency criterion (Q*). The greater the 
difference between social and private costs, the greater the misallo- 
cation. Air pollution is often cited as a classic example of a nega­
tive externality. Because the cost of using the environment as a 
waste dump is less for the polluter than for rest of society, the air 
is overused as a disposal medium.
"Positive" externalities, the analog to negative externalities, 
arise when the marginal social benefit (MSB) of some activity exceeds 
the marginal private benefit (MPB) (see Figure 2-2). In this case, 
private output is less (Qp) than under efficient resource allocation 
(Q*). Again, the greater the difference between social and private 
benefits, the greater the misallocation. Scenic vistas provide an 
example of a positive externality. A private owner may find it diffi­
cult to capture the value of a scenic view and, hence, may produce 
less of these views than would be socially optimal. For the natural 
environments examined in this paper, the concept of positive externalities
33
Figure 2-1 
Negative Externality
MSC
VALUE MPC
P*
PP
MB
QpQ *
OUTPUT
Figure 2-2 
Positive Externality
MC
VALUE
P*
Qp Q*
OUTPUT
34
is a particularly useful scheme. Many other goods— parks, wildlife 
habitat, and so forth— have often been considered positive externalities.
Public Goods
Public goods are more extreme cases of the positive externality 
problem and have provided a strong argument for government allocation 
of natural environments. Samuelson first described "public goods" in 
economic terms in 1954.2 His original definition described public 
goods as distinguished (from private goods) by nonexcludability and 
jointness in consumption. Public goods can also be distinguished from 
private goods by their vertically summed demand curves (private good 
demand is summed horizontally), which illustrates jointness of con­
sumption.̂  To be more specific, a public good is one for which users 
cannot be excluded and the marginal cost of use approaches zero.
Because of these characteristics, there exists no incentive for any 
individual or firm to produce such a good. National defense is perhaps 
the classic example of a public good, but many natural areas are 
considered to have public good characteristics— national parks, 
wilderness areas, and wildlife refuges, for example. By definition, a 
pure public good must be provided by government in order for efficient 
allocation, or any allocation for that matter. Public goods can also 
be described as the extreme case of positive externality— the divergence 
between private and social benefits is maximized; in effect there are 
no private benefits to be realized from the production of a pure 
public good.
Natural resource economists have applied the public good model to 
many of the natural environments examined in this paper. Krutilla, 
for example, argued that a good might also be considered public be­
cause of indivisibility, irreversibility, and various nonmarket de­
mands.4 She concept of indivisibility suggests that certain goods 
must remain intact for them to maintain their value; that is, the 
Grand Canyon would not have the same value if only half of it were 
preserved. Because of indivisibility, it is difficult for a private 
owner to own such a "large" resource. Hie irreversibility argument 
suggests that the nature of some resources is such that any develop­
ment would destroy the resource for all time. Once Old Faithful has 
been developed for geothermal energy, its ecological and aesthetic 
value would likely be destroyed. Regarding nonmarket demands, econo­
mists have argued that many people value natural areas such as wilder­
ness simply because they exist (existence demand), because they would
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like to have the option of visiting a wilderness (option demand), and 
because they would like to pass on wilderness to their children (be­
quest demand).5 It is difficult for a private owner to capture these 
values with a market price for entry.
Because of the public good characteristics mentioned above, pri­
vate individuals will often behave as "free riders" and avoid re­
vealing their true willingness to pay for such goods. Accordingly, 
private individuals and firms have no incentive to produce these 
goods. Since these goods are wealth-creating, in the sense that they 
provide utility for individuals, government production of these goods 
is justified by economic theory. The protection of natural environ­
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ments, such as scenic areas and wildlife habitat, is considered to be 
a public good by most contemporary natural resource economists.6 As 
such, the public good-positive externality model is useful for an­
alyzing the role of institutions in protecting natural environments.
Common Property
The third economic concept relevant to the protection of natural 
areas is the problem of common property. Common property (or a common 
pool resource) is simply a resource for which there exists no exclu­
sive property rights to use or allocation. With respect to this 
paper, such natural environments as ocean fisheries, wildlife habitat 
(especially for migratory species), and watersheds are examples of 
common property. Common property provides the institutional setting 
for resource overexploitation as individuals seek to maximize their 
own welfare by utilizing the resource. Essentially it is the nature 
of these resources that often hinders the establishment of property 
rights. In addition, many publicly owned resources have attributes 
that may be considered to be common property? backcountry recreation 
in many of our wilderness areas is a good example.
Perhaps the most elegant treatment of the misallocations that 
result from common property institutions was "The Tragedy of the 
Commons" by ecologist Garrett Hardin in 1968.7 Hardin pointed out that 
in a system where no one has exclusive rights to use a resource the 
resource itself will be ultimately destroyed as individuals seek to 
maximize their own gain. Formal economic analysis of common pro-
Operty, however, has been advanced by the work of Gordon and Cheung.
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Gordon was one of the first to note that common property resources 
yield no economic rent; that is, no returns exceeding opportunity 
costs. Cheung later elaborated the mechanism by which these rents 
from "nonexclusive" (common property) resources are dissipated and how 
private contracting may arise to curb the dissipation of these rents.
As has been pointed out by those who have contributed to the 
economics literature regarding common property, wealth maximizing 
individuals tend to overuse resources held in common. This predict­
able result has been documented for many different resources.9 Be­
cause common property leads to losses in social welfare, the institu­
tion itself has serious shortcomings. Government regulation of common 
property and the establishment of private property rights are two ways 
of modifying the insitution such that private and social costs align 
more closely.10
Understanding the institution of common property is important for 
an analysis of the institutions that are used to protect natural 
environments. Wildlife (and wildlife habitat) represent the aspect of 
natural area protection most closely fitting the common property 
model, although neither is common property in the pure sense. Since 
1842, court decisions in the United States have ruled that wild ani­
mals are public property belonging to people of individual states as 
well as the nation.11
When examining natural environments from a common property view­
point, the appropriate questions are: (1) when did—-if they did—
private property rights to the resource arise and in what form, and 
(2) when did— if it did— government establish rights to the resource
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and how does it govern use and allocation of the resource. In many 
cases, wildlife and rangeland, for example/ the government established 
rights to use and allocation of a commmon property resource in order 
to prevent overuse. In this paper, the appropriate use of the common 
property model is the analysis of the establishment of rights (both 
public and private) to the resource and how those rights influence 
resource allocation. Little attention will be paid to existing common 
property institutions (such as groundwater basins) as they have little 
relevance for this paper. The common property problem regarding 
natural environments is not one of continued "tragedies/" but one of 
establishing rights systems that lead to efficient resource alloca­
tion. Economic analysis of common property shows that when the nature 
of a resource prohibits the establishment of private rights/ govern­
mental action is warranted in order to curb the overexploitation of 
the resource.
"HeM Resource Economics";
The £ase £or Erivate Institutions 
The traditional market failure analysis shown above indicates 
that private institutions will have difficulty protecting the optimal 
amount of natural environments because of public good-positive 
externality and common property problems. Recently, however, there has 
developed a new paradigm for natural resources economics that is 
critical of traditional neoclassical market failure analysis and of­
fers an explanation for some of the government inefficiencies 
described in Chapter 1. The paradigm has been labeled the "New
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Resource Economics" by those scholars most closely involved with its 
developing literature.1^
The New Resource Economics
The new resource economics has been termed "old ideas and new 
applications" and is a blend of neoclassical, property rights, public 
choice, and Austrian economics specifically applied to the problems of 
natural resource management and allocation.1-* Neoclassical economics 
is the paradigm most often taught in American universities today. 
Anderson has identified the central elements of the neoclassical 
paradigm as marginal analysis, information and uncertainty, and in­
terest (capital) theory.14 Accordingly, the neoclassical micro- 
economic model illustrates the efficiency of a perfectly competitive 
market. Because of its recognition that decisions are made on the 
margin in an uncertain world where information is scarce, the neoclas­
sical model provides important insights into natural resource alloca­
tion. However, because the neoclassical model emphasizes market equi­
librium and underestimates the importance of institutions, the model 
often has difficulty in explaining real world decisions.
Property rights theory, a subset of neoclassical economics, de­
veloped rapidly during the 1960s beginning with the publication of 
classic articles by Coase and Demsetz.1  ̂ Since that time, a paradigm 
has developed that utilizes methodological individualism (as does 
traditional neoclassical economics) and assumes that the individual 
attempts to maximize his net welfare (not simply "profit") within the 
existing institutional setting. Property rights economics forces the
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analyst to examine the structure of property rights to resources in 
order to determine the incentives faced by decision makers. Property 
rights economists also acknowledge the importance of transaction 
costs; because these costs are nearly always positive, they must be 
considered when analyzing resource allocation. By linking ownership 
rights, incentives, and economic behavior, the property rights para­
digm expands the scope of economics beyond the competitive market 
equilibrium emphasized by neoclassical theorists.
Public choice theory, also a subset of neoclassical economics, is 
closely tied to the property rights paradigm. Public choice econo­
mists realize the importance of institutions and incentives in shaping 
economic behavior, but they focus their analysis on decisions made 
outside the market by voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. Public 
choice theory has spawned a vast body of literature that outlines the 
economic logic of government resource allocation.̂ -6 Ihe theory of 
public choice allows the economist to critically examine alternatives 
to market allocation.
Austrian economics is, first of all, not a subset of neoclassical 
theory. The Austrian perspective developed concurrently with neoclas­
sical theory during the late 1800s and is decidedly a different per­
spective, though often underestimated and overlooked by contemporary 
economists. Austrian economists stress the subjectivity of individu­
ally held values and emphasize the market as a process that is able to 
transmit knowledge concerning diverse and changing values through the 
price system.^ To the Austrians, the market is best considered as an 
information system. Austrians also stress entrepreneurship, the ten-
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dency of individuals motivated by profit to move resources to higher 
valued uses. The Austrian perspective also points to the inherent 
difficulty of centralized economic planning because of the impossi­
bility of obtaining correct information (without prices) and the lack 
of socially efficient incentives. Like public choice theory/ the 
Austrian paradigm causes one to be critical of the government's abil­
ity to efficiently allocate natural resources.
By utilizing the insights of these four perspectives/ the new 
resource economics offers a more general theory of natural resource 
allocation than does any single perspective. The new resource eco­
nomics allows one to examine the institutions through which resources 
are distributed and make policy prescriptions based on that analysis. 
The paradigm of the new resource economics stresses the fact that 
there is no such thing as a perfect and costless economic system and 
that sound policy attempts to establish the "least imperfect" system.
With regard to the protection of natural environments, the new 
resource economics offers an explanation of the evidence presented in 
Chapter 1, evidence that showed that private institutions are pro­
tecting natural areas and evidence that public institutions are de­
grading natural areas. An analysis of "government failure" (the 
market failure analog) will be used to outline the economic logic 
behind the bureaucratic inefficiencies described in Chapter 1. In 
addition, a critical look at market failure analysis will be used to 
explain why private institutions are actually protecting natural envi‘ 
ronments when conventional theory suggests that they do not have that 
ability.
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Government Failure
The underlying logic behind government failure is the same as it 
is for market failure: decision makers are not held responsible for 
their actions. Because government decision makers (politicians and 
bureaucrats) do not hold property rights to the resources they allo­
cate (i.e., they lack "residual claimancy"), they do not face strong 
incentives to use resources efficiently. In addition, bureaucrats and 
politicians make decisions largely outside the market and do not 
receive information in the form of prices. 'There are five specific 
phenomena that explain why government agents tend to ignore the mar­
ginal principle as a decision rule.18 These phenomena are: (1)
rational ignorance, (2) the special interest effect, (3) the bundle 
purchase effect, (4) the short-sightedness effect, and (5) little 
incentive for internal efficiency.
First, voters in a democratic society tend to be "rationally 
ignorant" of issues that do not immediately concern them. The simple 
fact that most Americans cannot even name their own Congressmen 
vividly illustrates this point.19 On the other hand, the average 
citizen is acutely aware of public policy directly influencing his own 
well-being. Farmers in North Dakota know (or care) little about 
Montana wilderness policy but are keenly aware of the latest federal 
farm bill. Likewise, Montana backpackers tend to have little interest 
in farm policy but are quite knowledgeable about current policy con­
cerning energy exploration in their favorite wilderness areas. For 
economists who recognize information as a scarce good, this rational 
ignorance should come as no surprise.
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A second phenomena is the "special interest effect" and is exem­
plified by the parable of the North Dakota farmer and the Montana 
backpacker. When an individual's vested interests are at stake, he 
makes an effort to become informed and influence public policy. When 
issues become suffiently narrow (as do such issues as farm policy and 
wilderness legislation) and when individual interests of a small group 
become sufficiently large (as in farm and wilderness issues), "then a 
narrowly focused but highly motivated special interest group is likely 
to wield enormous political clout."̂ ® When such a situation exists, 
as it often does in representative government, the general taxpayer 
contributes to the special interest kitty without being asked. From 
the perspective of the special interest, the treasury is a common 
property resource.
Third, because individuals place only one vote in the political 
system for a representative who must speak for him on every issue, 
there is an inherent lack of precision in political decision making. 
Economists have labeled this the "bundle purchase effect." Even the 
well-informed voter has little hope of expressing all of his prefer­
ences in a political setting; in direct contrast is a market setting 
where a "voter" (buyer) can express his preference specifically on a 
multitude of "issues."
Fourth, since politicians and bureaucrats must provide satisfac­
tion to current constituents, they suffer from a "short-sightedness 
effect." Politicians are concerned primarily with pleasing current 
voters, and bureaucrats are often concerned primarily with appeasing 
current special interest groups. Future generations are rarely given
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genuine consideration in political-bureaucratic decisions. There is 
no a priori reason to expect that decisions made in the public sector 
will adequately consider the welfare of future generations. Beyond 
two, four, or six years, the discount rate of the politician is likely 
to approach infinity.
Finally, there is "little incentive for internal efficiency" in 
the public sector. Decision makers are not residual claimants; that 
is, they can rarely gain personally from making efficient choices. In 
short, they cannot capture any residual or profit that might result 
from wise decisions. Instead of maximizing utility by seeking pro­
fits, bureaucrats seek such things as "salary, perquisites of the 
office, public reputation, power, patronage, and (increased) output of 
the bureau."22 Similarly, they lose little by choosing an inefficient 
alternative. Politicians and bureaucrats are usually removed from the 
information (prices) available in the marketplace. Government re­
source allocation can be expected to have significant problems in 
attaining the social optimum for the same reason as the market system;- 
in effect, "authority and responsibility" are separated under imper­
fect property rights arrangements.
All of these points illustrate the imprecision of government 
resource allocation. Recognizing the imperfections that are inherent 
to government decision making helps explain how bureaucratic manage­
ment has resulted in inefficient resource use and degraded natural 
environments (see Chapter 1). Politicians and special interest groups 
have incentive to support costly and inefficient public programs, the 
average voter has incentive to remain ignorant of these programs, and
45
the bureaucrat has no incentive to follow a marginal decision-making 
rule based on economic valuation. A program such as chaining appeases 
local ranching interests (who receive subsidized forage improvement) 
and their congressmen (who have favors to handout to their consti­
tuents) and remains obscure to most voters (who are "rationally ig­
norant"). More important, the bureaucrats who manage the program have 
no incentive to curtail it when the last acre chained begins to have 
costs that outweigh benefits. As Sowell has noted, ''Given categorical 
mandates and the law of diminishing returns, it is virtually inevit­
able that governmental agencies would eventually end up doing things
23which seem irrational as isolated decisions."
Property Rights and Market Failure 
While the preceding government failure analysis offers an ex­
planation for public degradation of natural areas, the traditional 
market failure analysis suggests that the private protection of na­
tural areas (described in Chapter 1) should not occur. By utilizing 
the property rights paradigm within the new resource economics, one 
can critically examine the nature and extent of the public good- 
positive externality and common property problems. It should be 
remembered that these two aspects of market failure are important for 
analyzing the private protection of natural environments.
Natural environments 'are often considered to be a prime example 
of public goods-positive externalities. While the positive exter­
nality model is useful in illustrating problems of inefficiency, it 
does little to address the root cause of the inefficiency. By util-
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izing the property rights paradigm, the divergence between private and 
social benefits can be seen as an absence of efficient property 
rights. A private owner who is unable to have exclusive and trans­
ferable rights to a scenic view is unlikely to provide such a view for 
social consumption.
Another analysis of externality has been put forth by Cheung who 
has argued that "externality" is a misleading term and that the real 
issue is transaction costs and uncontracted activities.24 Where the 
costs of transacting a contract between parties are greater than the 
benefits to be gained from the trade, a misallocation will occur. In 
the case of scenic vistas, it may be prohibitively costly for the 
owner to collect a fee from the passersby. Externalities, according to 
Cheung, are more appropriately seen as uncontracted effects, whether 
those affects are air pollution or scenic vistas. In the same vein, 
it is difficut to facilitate mutually beneficial contracts when pro­
perty rights are lacking.
The property rights-transaction costs analysis of externality 
points to different policy (both goals and tools) than does welfare 
economics in the Pigovian tradition, which has suggested that an 
appropriate goal is the elimination of externalities (internalization 
of all costs and benefits) via a govemmentally imposed system of 
taxes (to reduce negative spillovers) and subsidies (to stimulate 
production of positive spillovers). Coase and Cheung are but two 
economists who have attacked this approach.2** Essentially, they have 
argued that a more socially optimal policy would seek not to eliminate 
externality, but to minimize transaction costs that impede voluntary
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trade. The analyses by Coase and Cheung recognized the fact that 
"externalities" result from all activities apd that a policy that 
seeks to eliminate an externality may in fact impose costs that exceed 
the benefits of the intervention.26
An increasing number of economists have been criticizing the 
traditional application of the theory of public goods-positive ex­
ternalities. Coase* for example, described the system of private 
lighthouses in Great Britain and suggested that the lighthouse is not 
as complete an example of a public good as Mill, Sidwick, Pigou, 
Samuelson, and other economists have argued.2̂  Likewise, Cheung has 
described the elaborate system of contracting that has evolved between 
beekeepers and apple growers in the state of Washington. Cheung ex­
plained how private contracting has internalized the supposedly perva­
sive externalities associated with bee pollination services and apple 
blossom nectar services.2® Others have argued that when exclusion 
becomes more feasible private pricing schemes will develop to provide 
public goods without coercive action; in fact, some have argued that 
very few goods meet the nonexcludability characteristic originally 
described by Samuelson.29
The property rights examination of public goods-postive ex­
ternalities suggest that certain natural environments may have fewer 
public good characteristics than most natural resource economists 
assume. The degree of excludability is crucial to the private produc­
tion of public goods, and the evidence presented in Chapter 1 suggests 
that excludability is feasible in many instances. The public good 
problems that appear to be the most important for the protection of
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natural environments are "irreversibility" and various nonmarket de­
mands (i.e., bequest, existence, and option demand). Irreversibility 
is most important for unique resources, such as biological species, 
and less important for such things as wildlife habitat. By the same 
token it should be recognized that resource development can often 
proceed without harming irreplacable natural areas.3® The "free 
rider" problems of the nonmarket demands mentioned above are fre­
quently and at least partially overcome by voluntary donations to 
private conservation organizations who use their resources to protect 
natural environments.
When natural environments exist as common property, they are 
likely to be overexploited and, hence, degraded. Regarding natural 
environments, the problem of common property is not so much one of 
overexploitation, but one of establishing the correct set of property 
rights to use and allocation that will optimally allocate the resource. 
Government regulation has been a typical response to common property 
problems; the case of the Western rangeland is an example. In many 
cases, government control of a resource has actually legitimized the 
institutional problems of common property and in the process caused 
natural environments to be degraded.3  ̂ These government responses 
were implicitly based on the assumption that private institutions were 
incapable of efficient allocation; but as Demsetz and others have 
noted, private property rights to common property resources tend to 
evolve as the value of the resource becomes conmmensurate with the 
costs of defining and enforcing those rights.33 While the evolution 
of property rights is a subject that will be explored in the following
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chapter# it should be recognized that the mere existence of common 
property does not necessarily mean that private use will lead to 
overexploitation.
Summary
From the perspective of the new resource economics, the problem 
of market failure is best explained by the absence of well-defined, 
enforced and transferable property rights to the specific resource in 
question. Where such property rights are lacking, private institutions 
have difficulty allocating resources efficiently. The protection of 
natural environments has generally been treated by economists as an 
area where government action must be used to correct market failure. 
However, there is substantial evidence that suggests that the problem 
of market failure in protecting natural areas is less pervasive than 
is often assumed. In addition, the government failure analysis provided 
by the new resource economics helps explain why public institutions 
have often caused the degradation of natural areas. In the next 
chapter, I will examine the economic forces that explain the private 
protection of natural environments. Such an examination is a requi­
site for determining how one might further encourage the protection of 
natural areas.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATELY PROTECTED 
NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS
At this point, it should be clear that private institutions are
L,
capable (both in theory and in fact) of protecting natural environ­
ments. An inquiry into the economic logic behind this protection is 
the purpose of this chapter. I will begin by reviewing demand and 
supply components for the protection of natural areas. An examination 
of the structure and evolution of property rights to natural areas 
will follow. Prior to the chapter summary/ I will briefly examine such 
considerations as de facto protection, as well as the economics of 
nonprofit firms and philanthropists.
Demand and Supply Determinants 
In order to carefully examine the economic components of private 
protection, it is useful to begin by looking at the demand and supply 
determinants for the protection of natural environments. Such an 
examination will provide a framework for analyzing market allocation 
of these areas by private individuals and firms. I will make no 
attempt to specifically quantify such things as demand for waterfowl 
habitat or the supply of scenic vistas. I will, however, suggest that 
the demand for and supply of natural areas has changed during the 
course of America's history and that the general direction of that 
change can be observed and defined. In that vein, I will be taking 
a look at how the major demand and supply determinants have changed 
over the past 200 years.
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Demand
In economics, the law of demand states that "there will be a 
negative relationship between the price of a good and the amount of it 
buyers are willing to purchase."1 Price theorists in general have 
pointed to the following seven characteristics as those that determine 
the quantity of a good or service demanded at a given price: (1)
consumer income (wealth), (2) income distribution, (3) consumer pre­
ferences (tastes), (4) number of consumers (population), (5) price of 
related goods (both substitutes and compliments), (6) price expecta­
tions, and (7) the structure of property rights (i.e., the extent of 
exclusivity and transferability).2 Changes in any of these components 
will necessitate, ceteris paribus, a "shift" in demand. The following 
paragraphs examine the trends in these components as they relate to 
the demand for natural environments.
Environmental goods, including natural areas, are often said to 
be highly income elastic. In the words of Seneca and Taussig, authors 
of a leading text on environmental economics, "we hypothesize that 
environmental quality is a highly income elastic or luxury good, which 
means that households with relatively high incomes desire to consume a 
higher fraction of their income in the form of expenditures on envi- 
' ronmental quality than do households with relatively low incomes."3 
Intuitively, this hypothesis seems quite plausible, and the limited 
available data are supportive. For example, studies have shown that 
users of national parks and wilderness areas have incomes signifi­
cantly above average.̂
Assuming, then, that natural environments are luxury goods, 
changes in per capita income are likely to have a significant impact
on demand. North, Anderson, and Hill report that per capita income in 
the United States has grown at an annual rate of 1.6 percent in real 
terms since 1840.̂  This represents a doubling every 43 years? in 
other words, the average U.S. citizen in 1983 is approximately 3 1/2 
times wealthier than his 1840 counterpart in terms of real income.
This evidence points to a significant increase in demand for natural 
areas since the 19th century when conservation policy was developing. 
Regarding the distribution of income. North, Anderson, and Hill point 
out that income distribution has changed relatively little during 
America's history.** In addition, there is little, if any, evidence 
detailing the impact of differing wealth distribution on the demand 
for natural areas.
Population, or numbers of consumers, obviously influences aggre­
gate demand. Since 1790 when the U.S. population was 3,929,214 to 
1970 when population was 203,235,298, population increased by over 50 
times (see Table 3-1). It logically follows that this extremely large 
increase in the number of potential consumers has caused an increase 
in demand. Although one could argue that preferences have changed 
such that individuals value natural environments relatively higher 
than they have in the past, I will not take the time to do so. Suf­
fice it to say that demand for natural environments today is likely to 
be higher than any time in the recent past due to significant in­
creases in population and per capita income, as well as possible 
Changes in the preferences of society's individuals.
Since little work, either theoretical or empirical, has been done 
to examine the impact of related good prices or price expectations on
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Table 3-1
U.S. Population and Population Density, 1790-1970
Year Population
Density 
(population per square 
mile of area)
1970 203,235,298 57.5
1960 179,323,175 50.6
1950 150,697,361 50.7
1940 131,669,275 44.2
1930 122,775,046 41.2
1920 105,710,620 35.6
1910 91,972,266 31.0
1900 75,994,575 25.6
1890 62,947,714 21.2
1880 50,155,783 16.9
1870 39,818,449 13.4
1860 31,443,321 10.6
1850 23,191,876 7.9
1840 17,069,453 9.8
1830 12,866,020 7.4
1820 9,638,453 5.5
1810 7,239,881 4.3
1800 5,308,483 6.1
1790 3,929,214 4.5
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical
Statistics OL the united States: Colonial Times to 1970., Part I 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 8.
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the demand for natural areas, little will be said here. It is likely, 
however, that there exist few close substitutes for wildlife, scenic 
amenities, or ecological stability, lhat fact would also suggest that 
demand is quite price inelastic; the fewer available substitutes the 
more inelastic is demand. Consumption data on complementary goods 
like backpacks, rifles, cross-country skis, binoculars, cameras, and 
Gore-tex clothing could potentially provide valuable information on 
demand for. natural areas, but sound data and application are lacking. 
One complementary good for which demand impact is descernable is 
transportation. Lower transportation costs over time have undoubtedly 
increased the demand for natural areas.
Price expectations typically influence demand in the following 
manner: if higher future prices are expected, demand will rise; if,
however, lower future prices are expected, demand will fall. At best, 
it is unclear how price expectations have influenced demand for na­
tural areas, especially considering the fact that many such areas are 
provided at a zero price by government. The role of property rights 
in affecting demand is of crucial importance and will be more closely 
analyzed later in this chapter. It is important, however, to note 
here that different property rights arrangements will yield different 
pricing schemes that accordingly influence demand.®
Despite the absence of significant data, it seems to be reason­
able to state that the demand for natural environments has grown 
significantly during the course of American history. Changes in 
income, population, and preferences explain this demand shift best. A 
lack of close substitutes also suggests that demand is quite price
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inelastic, especially for unique goods, such as the Grand Canyon. One 
might graphically display the changing demand over the last 200 years 
as in Figure 3-1. Trend data for outdoor recreation supports the 
contention that demand for natural areas has increased substantially 
over the past two centuries.9
Figure 3-1
The Characteristics of the Demand 
for Natural Environments, 1790-1980
VALUE
Dd 1790
Dd 1980
QUANTITY
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Supply
Hie other major concept in economics is the law of supply, which 
has been called "a principle which states that there will be a posi­
tive relationship between the price of a good and the amount of it 
offered for sale by sellers."10 In general, supply is determined by 
the following six components: (1) stock of the resource, (2) state of
technology, (3) input prices, (4) market access (entry), (5) information, 
and (6) uncertainty.11 Any change in these components can facilitate 
a "shift" in the supply schedule, which has been described as "a 
change in the minimum price necessary to generate each different rate 
of output."1  ̂ Regarding natural environments, "supply" is taken 
to mean the amount of goods and/or services that is available from 
natural areas. Quite obviously, the stock of natural areas is a 
crucial variable in this supply function. Technology, in turn, is an 
important variable in determining the stock of natural areas. Hie 
impacts of technological change on the stock of natural environments 
is ambiguous; technological advancement has pushed the stock in both 
directions. Krutilla has argued that technology impacts natural 
areas differently than other processed goods.11 While technological 
advances can increase the stock of rugby balls (by reducing production 
costs and using resources more efficiently), it is difficult to increase 
the stock of Grand Canyons via technological advancement. Krutilla 
further stated that "the supply of natural phenomena is virtually 
inelastic."1  ̂ Accordingly, it would seem that technological improve­
ments would make it "economical" to develop resources from pristine
61
environs that were at one time of no value for production purposes, 
thus further reducing the stock of natural phenomena.
Krutilla's supply inelasticity argument can be refined. The 
inelasticity is closely linked to the "irreversibility" of the resource 
stock in question. For unique biological-geological resources as Old 
Faithful or the Grand Canyon, supply inelasticity is found; but for 
waterfowl habitat on the northern prairie, the supply is more elastic. 
Technology in wildland reclamation may ultimately be a determining 
factor in the stock of natural areas; thus, influencing the supply of 
goods and services provided from natural areas.^ Timberline Recla­
mation, for example, is a company that reclaims streams in order to 
enhance the productivity of the natural fishery (see Appendix C). The 
technological advances made by Timberline Reclamation most certainly 
have increased the stock of natural areas. In essence, technology has 
an important, but ambiguous and often counterbalancing impact on the 
stock of natural environments. Generally, however, during the course 
of American history, technological advances have often reduced the 
stock of those areas.
Regarding the effect of input prices, market access, information, 
and uncertainty on the supply of natural area goods and services, 
little will be said here. Since the allocation of these goods and 
services is generally not a typical production process (in the sense 
of adding labor and capital to natural resources), input prices are 
largely irrelevant to the allocation question, except to the extent 
that the costs of defining and enforcing property rights might be
62
considered input prices. An examination of property rights will come 
later in this chapter.
Market access is a crucial point that will also be examined 
within the context of property rights arrangements. For example, 
the fact that wildlife have long been declared (by the courts) to be 
public property has often hindered the ability of the private sector 
to manage land for wildlife purposes. Information and uncertainty are 
also important supply determinants. The lack of accurate information 
is a problem in all economic systems and the degree of inaccuracy will 
influence output supply. With respect to goods and services from 
natural environments, where price information is so often lacking, it 
is quite plausible that supply is suboptimal. Uncertainty about 
future demand can also impact the supply; in fact much of the debate 
over environmental preservation issues is implicitly a debate over the 
future demand (value) of natural environments.
Because the forces of technology can shift supply in two direc­
tions (by impacting resource stocks as well as the cost of providing 
goods and services) and because it is difficult to pinpoint the specific 
impacts of the other supply determinants, it is difficult to make 
strong statements about the long-term trend regarding the supply of 
goods and services from natural areas. While it is recognized that 
there are fewer roadless areas in the U.S. today than in 1776 and that 
certain species have become extinct during that same period, it is 
difficult to determine the long-term supply trend for these goods and 
services. One might postulate that resource stock has declined for 
most of U.S. history and has increased in recent years, however, there
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does not appear to be any significant research (either theoretical or 
empirical) to allow one to make a more substantive statement about the 
changing supply of goods and services provided by natural environments.
The preceding demand and supply analysis, while by no means 
conclusive, suggests that the price (value) of natural environments 
has risen during the course of American history. This suggestion is 
drawn from evidence pointing to a large increase in demand and a 
likely decrease in supply (although supply may be increasing in recent 
years) for these areas. One of the difficulties of analyzing demand 
and supply in greater detail is the difficulty of accurately categor­
izing a particular resource as a "natural environment." Nevertheless, 
the preceding section has illuminated at least some of the economic 
forces surrounding the protection of natural environments.
The Structure and Evolution of Property Rights
While an examination of the private protection of natural areas 
could utilize the concepts of externality, public goods, and common 
property, a more complete and in-depth analysis is one that examines 
the structure and evolution of property rights to these resources.1® 
Positive externalities-public goods are cases where existing property 
rights do not allow optimal price exclusion, and common property is a 
case where property rights simply do not exist. In these cases, 
private institutions are easily shown to be inefficient. Natural 
environments are generally put into these broad, often ambiguous 
categories. In this section, I will outline the existing theory 
regarding the evolution of property rights and the form in which they
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evolve. In addition, I will apply this theory to the allocation of 
natural areas in an attempt to gain a better understanding of private 
protection than is possible via the typical market failure analysis.
The Evolution of Property Rights
The economic literature dealing with the formation of property 
rights from common property began with Demsetz's "Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights."1"̂ In his original thesis, Demsetz stated that 
"property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains 
to internalization become larger than the cost of internalization."1® 
Demsetz described the establishment of hunting territories by the 
Montagnais Indians (who lived on the Labrador Peninsula) as the value 
of the fur-bearing animals in the area increased.19
Anderson and Hill, however, were the first to explicitly define, 
the variables important to the establishment of private property 
rights.̂ ® They used a simple model that compared the marginal bene­
fits and costs of defining and enforcing property rights to explain 
the equilibrium level of definition and enforcement activity. Ander­
son and Hill's model also helped explain the changing structure of 
property rights over time. The marginal benefit of defining and 
enforcing rights is linked to resource scarcity, which is determined 
to a great degree by physical scarcity and changing preferences. As 
will be shown later, the benefits of defining and enforcing rights to 
wildlife and wildlife habitat have been increasing over time as 
wildlife has become more valuable.
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The marginal cost of defining and enforcing rights is largely a 
function of "technology, resource endowments, and scale of opera­
tions," all of which change the quantity of resources or the oppor­
tunity cost of production.21 As Anderson and Hill noted, the develop­
ment of barbed wire fencing was a technological advance that drama­
tically lowered the cost of defining and enforcing rights to the 
grassland of the Great Plains. Anderson and Hill applied their model 
to the system of property right to land, livestock, and water in the 
American West and found it to be a powerful tool for explaining the 
evolution of rights to those resources out of a system of common 
property.
(Jmbeck further expanded the theory of evolving property rights 
and applied it to the California Gold Push.22 Following Cheung's 
rent-dissipation model, Umbeck postulated that "there are potential 
gains from (exclusion) . . . and establishing property rights" to a 
common property resource.21 When these rights will be established 
will depend on the value of the resource and the cost of negotiating 
and enforcing the property rights. A fundamental addition to the 
theory of evolving property rights is his assertion that "as the value 
of a piece of property rises, the cost of enforcing the rights to that 
will also rise," but that the value of a piece of property will rise 
faster than the costs of negotiation and enforcement.2  ̂ Accordingly, 
there will be an optimal point at which the establishment of rights 
makes economic sense.
limbeck's argument that enforcement costs will rise with property 
value is certainly plausible in a static sense, but it ignores both
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the dynamics of technological change and the impact of government 
policy. In addition, Umbeck's model (as well as those of Anderson and 
Hill and Demsetz) ignores the degree of transferability as a variable 
in determining the net benefits of establishing property rights to a 
nonexclusive resource. A more complete model building on Demsetz, 
Anderson and Hill, and Umbeck is illustrated in Figure 3-2.
Assuming that the value of a resource rises over time and the 
cost of defining, enforcing, and transferring private rights is con­
stant over time, an individual would establish rights to a common 
property resource at time T*. The costs of defining, enforcing, and 
transferring rights are, in effect, the component costs of establishing 
rights. Exogenous forces that alter these costs ultimately alter the 
optimal time for the establishment of private rights. These exogenous 
forces include technology and government activity. Changing technol­
ogy will generally reduce these costs and speed up the process of 
rights establishment. Technological advances, such as barbed wire, 
hot metal branding, electrical meters, and pollution monitoring equip­
ment, have all lowered the cost of defining, enforcing, and trans- 
fering rights.
Government activity, on the other hand, may either increase or 
decrease these costs depending on the specific action taken. At this 
point, it is unclear which has been the dominant impact; it is clear, 
however, that government policy has often influenced the evolution of 
property rights.^ This observation is extremely important to the 
allocation of natural environments. Government activity in the form 
of law, police protection, subsidization, tax exemption, and trade
Figure 3-2
Optimal Time for Establishing Rights to Coiranon Property
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Cost of 
Establishing 
Property rights
TIME
restrictions can lower the costs of establishing private rights. On 
the other hand, government actions such as legal barriers to trade, 
regulation, and taxation can increase the cost of establishing rights.
As suggested in Chapter 2, federal land disposal policy often 
contained riders that significantly increased the cost of establishing 
private property rights to land.27 Such restrictions also prolonged 
the period of common property resource use; in this respect, ineffi­
ciency was promoted. Public ownership, however, is the policy that
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raises the cost of establishing private property rights the highest. 
Federal land reservation and acquisition along with court rulings on 
public wildlife ownership are two areas of public ownership important 
for this paper. In these cases# the cost of establishing property 
rights is quite high# perhaps even infinitely high in some cases.
Along with the public ownership cost# other impacts are the indirect 
costs seen in the form of zero-priced competition. A partial reason# 
at least# for the relative lack of large-scale private outdoor recrea­
tion in Montana and Idaho is the fact that the federal government 
provides an enormous supply of these goods at a zero (or nearly zero) 
price. Accordingly# taxation, regulation# and licensure can also 
increase the costs of rights establishment.
While most of the literature has focused on the cost of defining 
and enforcing rights# the cost of transferring those rights is also an 
important variable in the establishment of property rights. The cost 
of transferring rights is largely influenced by the legal framework of 
a society. For various reasons# many types of transfers are re­
stricted or prohibited by law; as such# they are quite costly. In our 
society, certain transfers of property rights have been prohibited 
because of ethical objections to the trade; drug trafficing# gambling# 
prostitution# and slavery are common examples. Legal restrictions on 
the transferability of property rights also has implications for the 
protection of natural environments. Ownership of instream surface 
water has generally not been held to be "beneficial use" and# there­
fore# has not been considered a legitimate property right.̂ ® As such# 
the cost of establishing instream rights are prohibitively high.
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Legal constraints on the transfer of groundwater rights have also 
reduced efficient water use and led to environmental degradation.** 
Case law has continually declared wildlife to be the property of the 
state; accordingly, the cost of establishing rights to wildlife
onresources is prohibitively high.
While such exogenous variables as technology and government ac­
tivity have been shown to influence the optimal time of property 
rights establishment, one endogenous variable— the nature of the re­
source in question— is also important. Stationary, tangible resources 
like rangeland or even domestic cattle present relatively few problems 
in defining and enforcing rights. Air and migratory wildlife, however, 
have "fugitive" characteristics that in and of themselves increase the 
costs of establishing property rights. Accordingly, one would expect 
resources with such fugitive characteristics to remain as common 
property for a longer period than other resources.
Research (by Dennen; and North, Anderson, and Hill) supports the 
model depicted in Figure 3-2 and help explain the process of property 
rights establishment to the American West that was briefly described 
in Chapter 2.33 Dennen argued, consistant with the above theory, that 
there exists an optimal time to bring land into agricultural produc­
tion from an idle (natural) state. Regarding public land disposal in 
the 1800s, he stated the argument in the following ways "There is 
some optimal path of releasing land from the public domain and 
bringing it into production which will maximize the value of output. 
Releasing land more quickly will reduce output, as will releasing land 
too slowly."32
Dennen concluded that the Land Act of 1785, which authorized the 
sale of public land to the highest bidder (see Table 1-2), was the 
land policy disposal policy that most closely approximated the optimal 
solution. Consistant with the research by Johnson and Libecap (see 
Chapter 2), Dennen noted how homesteading policies forced land into 
production prior to the optimal time required to maximize value. These 
restrictive policies forced early production by requiring production 
in order to obtain legal patent to the land. As supporting evidence, 
Dennen cited both the high failure rate of prairie homesteads (which 
indicates that land was put into production "too soon") and the 
practice of idle land retention (for periods of up to 20 years) by 
land speculators during the era of land auction sales.
The land-rent model articulated by North, Anderson, and Hill in 
Growth fiind Welfare in the American Past elaborated Dennen's theory.33 
In their model (reported as Figure 3-3), an economically rational 
individual observing a parcel of land with rents rising over time (and 
beginning as negative) would establish property rights as soon as the 
net discounted present value (NDFV) of the land exceeded zero (some­
time prior to t*). The rational owner would then put the land into 
production at time t* in order to maximize NDFV. The observation of 
land speculation by Dennen is perfectly consistent with this model. 
Restrictive homesteading policies that required (among other things) 
cultivation, irrigation, and construction in order to secure legal 
patent (establish private property rights) forced land into production 
prior to t , thus dissipating rents and wasting resources.
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Figure 3-3 
Path of Land Rents Over Time
Source: Figure X.I; North, Anderson, and Hill, Growth and Welfare In
the American East* p. 117.
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One can apply the Dennen and land-rent models to the protection 
of natural environments. Is it quite likely that rents to be captured 
from producing or protecting wildlife habitat on the Western range 
have been negative throughout most of U.S. history (just as were the 
rents from wheat production op the Great Plains in 1865), and the 
rational owner would be acting in a socially responsible manner not to
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produce these goods. In 1983, however, many ranchers can capture 
significant rents by protecting wildlife habitat and selling the right 
to hunt and fish.35 Whether or not these production changes occurred 
at t* is an empirical question not addressed here. Efficient (wealth 
maximizing) policy would seek to stimulate production at t*; the area 
of environmental policy is no exception. Thus, the land-rent model 
also provides a framework for examining production changes on land 
where property rights already exist.
The Structure of Property Rights
Theory that attempts to explain the evolution of property rights 
is of crucial importance but increases greatly in value when linked to 
a theory of property rights structure. Such a theory attempts to 
postulate the form of ownership that will emerge from common property 
under various circumstances and how those property rights will change 
over time. It also looks at the specificity of rights definition and 
enforcement. Demsetz originally identified three specific ownership 
forms: "communal ownership, private ownership, and state owner­
ship."35 Demsetz described these ownership forms according to the 
method of exclusion: in communal ownership no state or person can
exclude others from use, in private ownership the owner may exclude 
users, and in state ownership the state may exclude users. Demsetz, 
however, did not attempt to formulate a theory as to the conditions 
fostering the different ownership patterns.
Following the literature concerning property rights evolution, 
Yandle has offered a theory describing the evolution of property
rights through four explicit stages.3̂  His four stages, which closely 
follow rights regimes under Roman Law, are: (1) common property, (2)
public property, (3) quasi-public property, and (4) private pro­
perty.38 In this scheme, Yandle notes the historical tendency for 
nation-states to establish rights to common property as overuse begins 
to show its face. Yandle applied his model to air quality— a quasi­
public property— and described the changing rights structure over 
time. Yandle's model and categories are useful but he makes little 
attempt to specify the factor involved in altering property rights 
arrangements.
Dennen and Umbeck have advanced theories regarding the structure 
of property rights beyond the preliminaries offered by Demsetz and 
Yandle.3  ̂ Dennen examined property rights to rangeland in the Ameri­
can West and suggested that three possible property rights regimes 
exist: (1) a regime in which exclusivity and intensity of use is
controlled, (2) a regime that controls only exclusivity, and (3) a 
regime with no control (common property). Prom Cheung's rent-dissipa- 
tion theory, it follows that regime II will yield the highest rent and 
regime 13 will ultimately dissipate all rents. Dennen's examination 
of grazing rules imposed by cattlemen's associations during the latter 
part of the 19th century supported the rent-dissipation model. Den­
nen's study also supported the implications of earlier property rights 
theories by illustrating how property rights became more clearly 
defined as resource value increased— regime 13 evolved into regime 12, 
which evolved into regime II. As the gains from more explicit pro­
perty rights definition become apparent, one would expect individuals
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to invest resources in that defintion; one expects the structure of 
rights to change in the direction of more explicit definition and 
enforcement.
Umbeck's study of property rights to California gold claims 
stressed the importance of contracting costs (which are ultimately a 
function of technology and the nature of the resource) in determining 
how property rights evolve out of common property. Umbeck described 
two potential types of regimes: (1) a "sharing contract" in which all
rents from a land parcel are shared but outsiders are excluded, and 
(2) a "land allotment contract" in which outsiders are excluded and 
each miner has a claim to all the rent from a clearly specified 
portion of the parcel.4  ̂ Sharing contracts will be chosen first when 
income variance is high and enforcement costs (for the contract group) 
are low because of the small number of individuals. As populations 
grow, land allotment contracts become more economical because enforce­
ment costs in sharing contracts rise quickly and the gains from 
sharing decline as income variance declines (as population increases). 
Umbeck's evidence from the California gold rush supported his theory: 
the first contracts were all sharing, but as population increased land 
allotment contracts came to dominate.
A later article by Umbeck in 1981 examined the initial structure 
of property rights distribution by examining such variables as the 
degree of land homogeneity and the relative difference in individuals' 
abilities in violent force and productivity.41 Where individuals have 
equal abilities to use violence (in order to obtain property rights) 
and to be productive, a homogenous resource will always be divided
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evenly among the competing users. When a resource is nonhomogenous, 
it will be divided in parcel sizes inversely related to its produc­
tivity. In both cases, the initial wealth endowment is equally, not 
randomly, distributed. , The California gold rush provided a test tube 
for Umbeck's theory because individual variation in abilities of 
violence and mining productivity were negligible. The evidence was 
supportive: rich gold lands were held in small parcels while large 
claims were generally less productive. Umbeck's theory may have 
something to say about the variance of size in agricultural operations 
across the country, especially with regard to the optimal size of an 
operation and its relationship to homesteading policies. In this 
regard, Umbeck's analysis is consistant with those who have suggested 
that land disposal policy was often inefficient.
The rather small body of literature dealing with the structure of 
emerging and changing property rights attempts to identify factors 
that ultimately influence the existing property rights structure.
Beginning with common property, there are basically three paths to 
take: (1) the establishment of public ownership (only in the presence
of a coercive state), (2) the establishment of private property 
rights, or (3) continued common property. Obviously, all three paths 
have been taken. Where the state has been absent, as it was in the 
California gold fields and on the cattle range of the Great Plains, 
private rights have often emerged through voluntary contracts to 
internalize the costs of continued common property.
Where the state has been present, policy has fostered both public and 
private rights to common property resources. In cases such as the buffalo
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and the arid Western range, the state established ownership rights when 
it was perceived that private ownership would be socially unproductive. 
For such an irreversible resource as the bison (a fugitive resource on 
the verge of extinction), the establishment of public ownership to a 
common property resource would seem to be economically rational. When 
resource irreplaceability is not a concern, state intervention in the 
process of property rights evolution (to common property) may be 
socially unproductive.^ There is evidence that under public owner­
ship there exist few incentives for resource managers to significantly 
reduce the problems of common property overexploitation.
It is well-known, for example, that recreational use on many of 
the public lands is excessive and that optimally priced user fees 
(which could restrict use and allocate the resource to those who value 
it most) are rarely used. Johnson has offered a partial explanation 
for this by stating: "While one could argue that user fees may be
appropriate for recreational use, the FS (Forest Service) not sur­
prisingly has shown little interest in fees. With negatively sloping 
demand curves, user fees would reduce the number of visitations and 
the political support recreationists give the FS."^ It is not clear, 
given the current state of the theory and evidence, what kind of 
policy is the most efficient method of handling the common property 
problem. While it is often difficult for individuals to establish 
property rights, it is also the case that government agents have 
difficulty in efficiently allocating resources.
Beyond Yandle's brief postulating, little theory has been ad­
vanced regarding the structure of public ownership that can emerge
from common property; research is needed in this area. Yandle# how­
ever# has suggested that private ownership will ultimately emerge from 
collective attempts at allocating common property. The work by Dennen 
and Umbeck indicate that property rights regimes are dynamic and 
change when exogenous forces make it economical to do so. In short# 
one can expect increased and explicit property rights definition with 
population increases# technological advances# and growing resource 
values. The recent development of conservation easements and lease 
arrangements to protect natural environments represents a detailed 
segregation and specification of property rights, one that is made 
possible by an increasing value for the resource (see Chapter 4# 
Appendix B# and Appendix C).
Umbeck's later work suggested that the initial property rights 
structure is influenced by the degree of resource homogeneity and by 
individuals' comparative advantage in violence (the ability to enforce 
rights) and productivity. In summary# existing research has identified 
resource value# technology# population# the degree of resource homo­
geneity# and individuals' comparative advantages as partial determi­
nants of property rights regimes. A theory that addresses the impact 
of government activity on the structure and evolution of property 
rights would be most useful; yet, outside of some of the literature on 
rent-dissipating land policy# little is currently available.
Other Considerations
Thus far# I have examined the private protection of natural 
environments from both a demand-supply perspective and a property 
rights perspective. In this section# I will examine two other areas
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relevant to private protection of natural areas: (1) de facto protec­
tion of natural areas and (2) nonprofit institutions and philanthro­
pists. Each of these areas has been an important factor in private 
protection of natural environments, and any such analysis would be 
incomplete without their inclusion. The literature in each of these 
areas is quite scanty, and I will attempt here only to establish a 
basic framework for looking at the empirical data (outlined in Chapter 
1). The property rights framework will also be utilized in these dis­
cussions.
De Facto Protection of Natural Environments
Perhaps one of the most overlooked mechanisms of protecting 
natural areas is through de facto protection by private owners. In 
such a case, the costs of development may simply outweigh the gains or 
there may be no conflict between resource development and natural area 
protection. Where this situation exists, the private profit-seeking 
landowner finds it in his own interest to preserve land in its natural 
state. To my knowledge, there exists no research documenting the 
extent of such preservation; the fact that it exists is illustrated by 
the lack of logging activities by Champion International in the Hell- 
gate Canyon east of Missoula, Montana.44 Untouched wetlands on the 
prairie of North Dakota provide another example of de facto preservation.
Recently there have been studies that suggest that federal agen­
cies have developed significant areas of land that would be left in 
pristine conditions given the incentives of private ownership (see 
Chapter 1). Hyde has studied timber management by the U.S. Forest 
Service in the Pacific Northwest and southwestern Colorado and found
that timber harvest operations had been expanded into many areas where 
sales, administration, and roading costs exceeded the value of the 
timber.4-* In the Douglas-Fir region (Oregon and Washington west of 
the Cascade crest), Hyde found that 3.2 million acres of public for­
estland were allocated to timber, even though they were unprofitable 
for timber production. Hyde also found the Forest Service to be 
expanding its timber program into over 400,000 acres of roadless area 
in the San Juan National Forest (Colorado) despite the fact that 
roading costs alone exceeded the stumpage value of the timber.
Studies by Barlow et al. have supported the work by Hyde. 4® They 
found that "below cost timber sales" were common in many of our na­
tional forests. Chaining programs by the Bureau of Land Management 
are another example of land development by public agenices that does 
not cover its costs. Dams and canals built by the Bureau of Reclama­
tion and the Army Corps of Engineers have often lacked economic justi­
fication and have disturbed natural areas. In short, there is a 
growing body of evidence that indicates that the profit-motive applied 
to our public lands would result in a significant amount of land 
preservation by default.47 Perhaps because protection is not the over­
riding goal in these cases, many people are uncomfortable with these 
data. In any case, it is evident that the profit motive can provide 
strong incentives for protection simply by providing information con­
cerning negative rents.
The existence of de facto protection of natural environments can 
be explained via the property rights models described in the previous 
section. Following North, Anderson, and Hill's land-rent model
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(Figure 3-3), de facto protection will occur at all times prior to t*, 
since production does not begin until that point. Policies that have 
encouraged production to begin prior to t* not only are inefficient 
but also degrade environments that would otherwise be preserved for a 
time. Both the land-rent model and the optimal timing model (Figure 
3-2) aid in the explanation of de facto protection that results from 
taking land out of production or even abandoning developed (cultivated) 
land. In these cases the "resource value curve" (Figure 3-2) and the 
"land-rent curve" (Figure 3-3) ultimately slope downward at some 
point, making it uneconomical to continue production or perhaps even 
to continue to define and enforce property rights. Farmland that has 
reverted back to rangeland or wetland constitutes an example of such 
de facto protection.
Economies of Nonprofit Conservation Organizations 
and Philanthropy 
In the area of natural environment protection, nonprofit organi­
zations have long played a major role in influencing policy and con­
trolling resources. Groups like the Sierra Club and the Audubon 
Society were organized before 1900 and are familiar to most Americans. 
Today, there are literally hundreds of private nonprofit conservation 
groups with millions of members and operating budgets in the millions 
of dollars (see Appendix B). These organizations own land for con­
servation purposes, support scientific research and education, and 
engage in political activism. They are certainly a major factor in 
contemporary conservation issues.
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While it is obvious that nonprofit firms should behave differ­
ently from profit-seeking firms (because of the different incentive 
structures)/ economists have not spent a great deal of time examining 
the behavior of nonprofit firms. Alchian and Allen have defined 
nonprofit firms as being characterized by "no group of trustees or 
directors or 'owners' who can decide to distribute the net gains to 
themselves as their own wealth, as can be done in a for-profit cor­
poration. Funds must be spent in the enterprise to further the pur-
/
pose of that enterprise."48 Because there is a lack of "residual 
claimancy" in the nonprofit firm, one would expect lower internal
AQ(within the firm) efficiency when compared to a profit-seeking firm. 
Managers of nonprofit firms are consistently observed reducing effi­
ciency by utilizing the firm's resources in ways that add to their own 
nonpecuniary income.̂ 8
Nonprofit firms are typically granted tax exemptions and other 
legal privileges. Newhouse has suggested that a hospital's nonprofit 
status may be justified in an "ethical sense"; this might also be true 
for conservation organizations, depending on one's values.This 
nonprofit status can also be justified via the theory of public goods. 
As was previously stated, there are certain aspects of natural envi­
ronments that may lead to suboptimal production by profit-seeking 
firms. The nonmarket (existence, bequest, and option) demands noted 
by Krutilla may be captured by nonprofit conservation organizations 
more effectively than by profit-seekers. Because nonprofit institu­
tions have specific goals other than profit maximization, they are 
able to garner funds from those who might otherwise be free riders.
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The Nature Conservancy, for example, is an example of a conserva­
tion organization that is able to capture the existence, option, and 
bequest demand for preserving natural areas.
Nonprofit conservation organizations may also increase efficiency 
by reducing the transaction costs associated with protection-develop- 
ment trade-offs. Many protection-development trade-offs are charac­
terized by a significant asymmetry of transaction costs; development 
interests are typically concentrated and well-defined, while preserva­
tion interests are usually widely diffused over individuals and area. 
Because of this cost asymmetry, different entitlements will yield 
different resource allocations— nonprof it conservation organizations 
that own land reduce the transaction costs of contracting for resource 
development and, hence, improve the efficiency of resource allocation 
for preservation purposes. For example, on public wilderness areas 
where development potential exists, the bargaining typically takes the 
following form: one or two development companies square off against a
diffuse group of wilderness supporters. However, when conservation 
groups own land they become a concentrated and well-defined interest 
in the same manner as the oil company that might have an interest in 
developing a portion of the land.52 As such, the costs of transacting 
are much reduced when compared to the public case.
While nonprofit conservation organizations may improve the effi­
ciency of public goods production by capturing nonmarket demands and 
reducing the transaction costs of contracting, they may also lead to 
internal inefficiency (like government agencies) because of the ab­
sence of residual claimancy. Little, if any, research has been done
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to examine the behavior of decision-makers within conservation organiza­
tions; but unless these groups are over-endowed with selflessf public 
spirited individuals, a certain amount of inefficiency must be ex­
pected. However, because private, nonprofit conservation organiza­
tions depend on voluntary contributions and donations, there does 
exist more incentive to be efficient than for government bureau­
cracies. As Sowell has stated, "The point is that a non-governmental 
organization subject to feedback from donors or customers has incen­
tives and constraints that lead to institutional decisions more at­
tuned to rational social trade-offs."53. Because of this, one would 
expect such organizations to be quite aware of opportunity costs of 
alternative land allocation schemes; these incentives are likely to 
foster innovative contractual responses to the problem of externality.
As will be shown in Chapter 4, this appears to be true in many cases 
(see also Appendices B and C).
Closely tied to the economics of nonprofit organizations is the 
role of philanthropy. Philanthropy (or charity) is and has been 
extremely important in natural area protection. John D. Rockefeller 
Jr., for example, was instrumental in establishing several national 
parks, museums of natural history, and preserving other scenic areas 
(see Appendix A). In Maine, ex-governor Percival P. Baxter donated a 
200,000-acre preserve containing Maine's tallest peak, Mt. Katahdin, 
known today as Baxter State Park.54 Many other charitable gifts by 
private individuals have aided the protection of natural environments, 
although few are as spectacular as the contributions of Rockefeller 
and Baxter (see Chapter 1 and Appendix A for more on this topic).
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Economists have examined philanthropic behavior even less than 
they have examined the behavior of nonprofit firms. Yet, the behavior 
of philanthropists is well within the bounds of economic science. As 
Alchian and Allen noted, philanthropic behavior is quite consistent 
with economic man if one assumes that individuals gain utility from 
their giving.55 From that base, economic theory can tell us how 
different rules might impact on the incentives to undertake charitable 
activities. For instance, tax laws that regard gifts of land to 
nonprofit conservation groups as tax-deductible charitable donations 
significantly increase the incentive for philanthropic behavior. As 
will be noted in Chapter 4, this fact has been extremely important to 
the success of many conservation groups.
Although I have only briefly touched on the issues involving the 
economics of philanthropy and nonprofit firms, it should be recognized 
that they play an integral part in private sector conservation. The 
absence of serious analysis of these points by economists is trouble­
some, given that nonprofit firms and philanthropists play such a large 
role in natural resource economics. A useful addition to the natural 
resource economics literature would be research into this portion of 
the private sector.
Summary
Before moving on to Chapter 4, where I will examine the record of
privately protected natural areas within the context of the economic theory
\
outlined here, it will be useful to summarize the major points of this 
chapter. First, the evidence suggests that during the course of American
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history, there has been a gradual outward shift in the demand for natural 
environments. Regarding the supply of these goods, perhaps the most 
important factor— technology— was shown to push the supply in both 
directions, depending on the specific circumstances. No attempt was made 
to determine how the point of optimal allocation has changed over time.
As shown in Chapter 2, externality, public goods, and common 
property form the economic framework for analyzing the inefficiencies 
often associated with the private protection of natural areas. All 
three of these problems may be examined as cases of ill-defined pro­
perty rights arrangements. Recent research in the public choice- 
proper ty rights tradition has suggested that the problems of exter­
nality and public goods are often overstated by natural resource 
economists. The ability of individuals to "internalize" externalities 
through contracting and to produce public goods has only recently been 
articulated in the economics literature.
The property rights literature has also shown the process by 
which private rights to common property emerge and the form in which 
they emerge. Rights to natural areas do not appear to be an excep­
tional case in this process and can often be produced by the private 
sector if the demand exists. Government policy was shown to have an 
important impact on the cost of establishing property rights to re­
sources and the subsequent cost of transferring those rights. Given 
the fact that many natural environments are characterized by legiti­
mate public goods qualities, any type of cost increasing policy acts 
only to reduce net social welfare. Both the legal precedents against 
owning water for instream purposes and against private ownership of
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wildlife have significantly hindered the private protection of natural 
areas.
Models by Dennen and by North, Anderson, and Hill have described 
an optimal time path for putting idle land into production. These 
models may also be applied to the efficient path of production changes 
on a given parcel of land. Today, there certainly exists more rents 
to be captured from natural area protection than could be 200 years 
ago. Through traditional market allocation along with de facto pre­
servation and nonprofit-philanthropic conservation, there is reason to 
believe that the private sector can be quite successful in protecting 
natural environments.
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CHAPTER 4
TOE PRIVATE PROTECTION OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS:
MECHANISMS AND INSTITUTIONS
In the preceding chapters, I have critically examined the conven­
tional view that state intervention is required to insure the protec­
tion of natural environments. In addition, several concepts in eco­
nomic theory were described in relation to the problem of protecting 
natural areas. In this chapter, I will examine the data shown in 
Chapter 1 by first looking at the mechanisms of protecting natural 
areas in the private sector. In addition, I will apply the property 
rights theory (described in Chapter 3) to the data shown in Chapter 1 
and Appendices B and C. Finally, I will offer some alternative insti­
tutional arrangements that might further enhance the ability of the 
private sector to protect natural environments.
The Mechanisms £QL Private Protection q£ Natural Environments 
The mechanisms available for the protection of natural environ­
ments in the private sector are numerous. As with any set of volun­
tary contracts, they are characterized by diversity and flexibility.
In the following section, I will briefly describe five mechanisms and 
give examples of each. During this examination, the importance of 
different property rights arrangements will be emphasized.
Fee Simple Ownership Natural Resources 
The most direct way for the private sector to protect natural 
areas is through fee simple ownership of natural resources. Most 
often this takes the form of land ownership, but it may also include
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ownership of water or wildlife (when legal institutions allow it) The 
protection of natural areas by private landowners may take place with 
or without profit-seeking and with or without specific conservation 
goals. Nonprofit conservation organizations like The Nature Conservancy 
may purchase land solely for preservation and scientific purposes. 
Profit-seeking firms like the International Paper Corporation, the 
Diamond-A Cattle Company, and the R-Ranch make a profit by managing 
their lands for wildlife, aesthetics, and recreation. Such management 
entails protection of natural environments. De facto protection is 
also important in the private sector; perhaps most importantly in the 
Eastern states where landowners provide the bulk of the region's 
scenic areas, open space, and wildlife habitat because of the absence 
of large tracts of public land.
Lease Arrangements 
Leasing is also a method by which those in the private sector can 
protect natural areas, generally at a lower cost than fee simple 
purchase of the land. Land leases for hunting have been used for 
years and are especially common in areas where public lands are 
scarce.̂ - Recently, H and H Hunting Unlimited leased over 200,000 
acres in central Montana in order to provide quality hunting for 
upland game birds and big game animals (see Appendix C). These lease 
arrangements allow agricultural landowners to capture some of the 
benefits of providing wildlife habitat. Nonprofit organization have 
also used leaseholds on property as a method of securing protection of 
valuable natural areas.2 Essentially, leases represent a more speci­
fic definition of property rights than does outright land ownership.
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Conservation Easements 
Conservation easements are perhaps the most recent innovation by 
non-profit conservation groups and are currently quite widely used. 
Brenneman defined an easement "as a priviledge on the part of the 
person entitled to it to make some use of the land subject to it in 
derogation of the possessory rights of the owner of the land."4 He 
further stated that "it is a property right# and its possessor is ; 
entitled to protection of it against not only the owner of the pro­
perty subject to it but against all others."5 In simple terms# an 
easement is nothing more than a specific property right to land held 
by a party other than the landowner.5 !
A conservation easement gives the conservation group a property, 
right in land development# recreational use# or whatever is desired to 
meet the goals of both the landowner and the group. Because such 
easements are voluntary contracts between the landowner and the con­
servation group, they may be tailored to fit each different land 
parcel (see Appendix E for an example of an actual easement). Each 
easement is different and allows both the landowner and the conserva­
tion group great flexibility in achieving their goals.
Since conservation easements are typically held to be a charit­
able donation to a non-profit organization# the landowner may often 
have significant tax incentives to grant an easement# particularly if 
the land has high development potential. In Montana# one group (the 
Montana Land Reliance) has protected over 21,000 acres through con­
servation easements (see Appendix B). In another example of conserva­
tion via easement# The Nature Conservancy has secured a complex ease­
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ment agreement with a diverse group of landowners in order to protect 
9 miles (4,240 acres) of the lower Blackfoot River in western 
Montana.̂
Restrictive Covenants 
Covenants that limit land use alternatives may also be used to 
protect natural environments. They are utilized in both the profit- 
seeking and non-profit sectors of the private economy.8 Unlike ease­
ments, which essentially are interests in land held by a party other 
than the owner, covenants are mutual agreements between two or more 
parties for the performance of some action. Restrictive covenants for 
the purpose of protecting natural environments restrict land use 
options so that environmental quality is maintained or enhanced. In 
recent years, entrepreneurs have been able to capture the benefits of 
protecting natural areas by placing restrictive covenants on their 
housing developments (see Appendix F for an example of a protective 
covenant). For example, developed property on the expansive Forbes 
Trinchera Ranch in south central Colorado is subject to scrutiny by a 
private environmental control committee.8 The use of covenants allows 
landowners to avoid or minimize the free rider problem and benefit 
from the protection of natural environments often thought of as posi­
tive externalities-public goods.
Assistance to Government Agencies 
The final way the private sector works to protect natural areas 
is by assisting government agencies, particularly in the area of land
acquisition for wildlife habitat and scenic areas. Because government 
agencies are often characterized by sluggish responses to public 
demands or legislated mandates, non-profit conservation organizations 
have played important roles in land acquistion for public use. Much 
of Redwood National Park, for example, was acquired for the National 
Park Service through the private efforts of the Save-the-Redwoods 
League (see Appendix B). When land that is valuable for such public 
uses as wildlife refuges or parks is available for sale, government 
agencies frequently are unable to obtain funding in time to make the 
purchase. Non-profit groups have a strong history of purchasing such 
land with the intent of selling it or donating it to such agencies as 
the Fish and Wildlife Service for recreation or wildlife management. 
Some groups have also "loaned" funds to agencies that are attempting 
to purchase land. For example, when private landholders within the 
Boundary Waters Canoe Area (a wilderness area in Minnesota) sought to 
sell their inholdings, the Izaak Walton League of America Endowment 
purchased many of these parcels and later turned them over to the 
Forest Service for wilderness management (see Appendix B). In these 
cases, public good aspects of natural area protection are met through 
private transactions; in addition, these activities help minimize the 
free rider problem.
Applying the Hew Resource Economics Paradigm 
Although the data in Chapter 1 (and associated appendices) does 
not lend itself to precise quantitative analysis, it is useful to 
examine individual cases in reference to externality, public goods,
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and common property issues in natural resource economics. As already 
mentioned, market allocation of resources tends to be efficient when 
property rights are well-defined, enforced, and transferable. Thus, 
as expected, the private sector has been most efficient in protecting 
those natural environments for which property rights can be estab­
lished at the lowest costs. Since the Cross Ranch and the Interna­
tional Paper Company were described in the most detail in Chapter 1, I 
will begin with those examples. Then I will examine selected pieces 
of data displayed in Appendices B and C with respect to entrepreneur­
ship, the structure and evolution of property rights, law and property 
rights, contracts and externalities, and awareness of opportunity 
costs.
With regard to the Cross Ranch, the land sales contract drawn up 
by The Nature Conservancy (see Appendix D) represents an attempt to 
minimize external effects of potential land use schemes on areas 
adjacent to the acreage most valuable for protection. For example,
The Nature Conservancy reserved all mineral rights to the land for 
sale and restricted land use to agriculture and grazing only. In 
addition, they reserved the right to approve any residential or com­
mercial construction as well as the right to access and excavation of 
any archeaological site that does not "unreasonably interfere with the 
buyer's agricultural use of the property." These stipulations will 
minimize any future externalities that might have arisen from such 
activities as surface mining or housing development. Essentially, 
these stipulations within the sales contract provide an example of how
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private contracting can minimize externalities/ much in the same 
manner as Cheung described beekeeper-orchard grower contracts.*®
Another interesting aspect of the Cross Ranch project is its 
relationship to a corporate farming act on the books in North Dakota 
since the 1930s. This legislation prohibits ownership of agricultural 
land by any nonfamilial corporations/ but it has not been vigorously 
enforced to date. Technically, however, all non-profit corporations 
that own farmland, including churches, university alumni associations, 
and The Nature Conservancy, are in violation of the law. Because of 
fears that family-owned farms might be endangered by corporate pur­
chases, there are currently efforts being made to increase enforcement 
of this law. If strictly enforced, this law would prohibit The Nature 
Conservancy from owning the Cross Ranch preserve.
The law represents a cost-increasing variable as depicted by the 
model found in Figure 3-2; the enforcement of the corporate farming 
act would very definitely increase The Nature Conservancy’s cost of 
establishing property rights to the Cross Ranch. In short, the cost 
of transacting a trade would increase because of limitations on rights 
transferability. One way this cost might be seen (if the law is en­
forced) is through transferal of the property to some individual or 
family who agreed to manage the land as would The Nature Conservancy. 
For future purchases, The Nature Conservancy might have to work 
through private buyers who met the requirements of the law. Such 
activities, by raising the cost of establishing property rights, would 
ultimately delay rights establishment (to nature preserves) at the 
margin.
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As shown in Chapter 3, exogenous variables, such as government 
policy, can significantly influence the cost of establishing property 
rights to resources. This ultimately influences resource allocation. 
International Paper (IP), for example, has forest land parcels that lie 
within many different state boundaries. Their management is deter­
mined, in part, by the political and economic conditions found in each 
state. In Louisiana, for example, IP has invested little in wildlife 
production primarily because there is no trespass law in that state. 
While the local police juries of the parish -government system may 
enforce trespass on the small holdings of familiar individuals, there 
is no such enforcement of rights for large commercial landowners like 
IP. Essentially, Louisiana law .makes the cost of establishing pro­
perty rights to wildlife habitat so high that on IP's Louisiana land 
it remains a common property resource open to exploitation by anyone. 
There is simply no incentive for IP to invest in wildlife resources 
when the institutional setting precludes them from capturing any 
returns on their investment.
IP's holdings in the Pacific Northwest (Washington and Oregon) 
represent another case where exogenous variables have increased the 
cost of establishing property rights to wildlife and recreational 
resources. IP owns approximately 1/2 million acres in the Northwest, 
but it has no wildlife-recreational management program for these 
holdings. The explanation for this fits well into the model depicted 
in Figure 3-2. First, IP's land in this region is surrounded by vast 
areas of federal land, most of which are open to public access at a 
zero price for hunting, camping, and other outdoor recreation.-̂
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Second, IP's land consists of parcels that were originally part of the 
railroad grant system; these lands are characterized by checkerboard 
(alternate sections were granted to railroads) ownership patterns. 
Because of the zero-priced competition provided by public land 
holdings and because IP's ownership rights to land are not contiguous, 
the cost of establishing property rights is quite high. As such, 
there is less incentive for IP to invest in wildlife-recreation pro­
duction on its Pacific Northwest forests than there is on its southern 
and eastern lands.
IP's rather recent push toward investment in wildlife and recrea­
tion production represents a shift in land use that can, in part, be 
explained by Dennen's optimal-time-of-production model and by the 
land-rent model (Figure 3-3) of North, Anderson, and Hill. Both of 
these models were described in Chapter 3. As resource values change, 
it makes economic sense for the rational owner to change his in­
vestment level as well as his production mix. Just as there exists an 
optimal time to establish property rights and bring land into agricul­
tural production (in order to maximize rent), there exists an optimal 
time to bring land into wildlife-recreation production. Given the 
general trends in demand for protecting natural areas (see Chapter 3), 
IP's rather recent shift toward wildlife-recreation production is 
consistent with both the Dennen model and the land-rent model.
There are several other cases of private protection of natural 
areas, which illustrate the theory found in the previous chapters.
The theory of entrepreneurship is readily applied to profit-seeking 
protectors of natural environments. As Kirzner has noted, the role
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of entrepreneurship in economic theory is often ignored; this is 
equally true in natural resource economics.1  ̂ Kirzner further sug­
gested that the entrepreneurial element in economics is "that element
of alertness to possibly newly worthwhile goals and to possibly newly
12available resources."
Many of the firms shown in Appendix C can be described in terms 
of entrepreneurship— entrepreneurs responding to new demands or util­
izing new combinations of resources. Timberline Reclamation# the firm 
that provides stream reclamation services/ is an example as is Oregon 
Aqua Foods/ the salmon ranching enterprise. Other examples include 
the R-Ranch/ a wilderness ranch in northern California in which indi­
viduals buy shares in the ranch; the many profitable wild game ranches 
in Africa; and the emergence of nordic ski centers which provide 
outdoor amenities as part of the package. In each of these cases# 
some entrepreneur or group of entrepreneurs perceived a demand for a 
new product or new means of production. And in each case# the entre­
preneur reaped significant rents from his alertness. The fact that 
these entrepreneurs have been successful suggests that demand for 
protected natural areas has increased over time. The problem with the 
theory of entrepreneurship— a problem that has often been recognized—  
is that the theory lacks analytical rigor. Currently# the theory is 
somewhat abstract and all-encompassing; it appears to explain many 
things, yet it is a difficult theory to test. Thus# while the role of 
the entrepreneur is certainly crucial to the protection of natural 
environments# it is a theory that must be referred to with caution.
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A theory more applicable to the data displayed in this chapter is 
Dennen's optimal-time-of-production model and the land-rent model of 
North/ Anderson/ and Hill. Just as it was applied to International 
Paper's production of wildlife-recreation goodsr it can be applied to 
other cases where land use changes have occurred. The 14/000-acre 
Burnt Pines Plantation in Georgia was formerly a land of cotton 
fields; today/ it is managed exclusively (and profitably) for the 
production of wild game, including quail and white-tailed deer. The 
R-Ranch wilderness ranch was a livestock ranch until the early 1970s; 
today/ it is managed for outdoor recreation/ wildlife/ and amenities. 
As resource values have changed/ rational owners seeking to maximize 
rents put the land into the protection of natural areas so that rents 
from amenity/ recreation, and wildlife production could be earned. As 
with agricultural production, there exists an optimal time to shift 
land use toward the protection of natural areas.
Following the model depicted by Figure 3-2, the optimal time of 
establishing property rights and beginning production depends on 
exogenous cost variables as well as the resources' value over time.
The influence of a corporate farming act on the Cross Ranch is but one 
example of government policy altering these optimal times. Laws that 
restrict or prohibit transactions are also important cost-increasing 
variables. Current case law, which regards wildlife and instream 
water rights as public property, has already been mentioned as leading 
to instances where the cost of establishing property rights is infin­
itely high. Such laws do little to promote efficiency and may in some 
cases stifle innovation. For example, in 1969 Malcom Forbes purchased
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168,000 acres of mountainous terrain along the crest of the Sangre de 
Cristo Mountains in south central Colorado. His intent was to estab­
lish a game preserve— the largest in the continental United States. 
Because the wildlife on Forbes property were legally considered public 
property, state wildlife officials required Forbes to drive off all 
native game from his property, fence it, and restock it with its own 
game. These requirements essentially raised the cost of establishing 
rights to the wildlife significantly beyond the benefits Forbes per­
ceived, and the game preserve was not established.-̂
Oregon Aqua Foods, the Weyerhauser Company subsidiary that 
ranches salmon on the west coast has also been significantly influ­
enced by government policy. In 1971, Oregon passed legislation that 
allowed release and recapture of salmon; this legislation lowered the 
cost of establishing rights to the salmon.-̂  In the neighboring state 
of Washington, however, salmon ranching is currently unlawful. The 
cost of establishing rights to the salmon was also lowered by techno­
logical improvements: new hatcheries were built and new release- 
recapture facilities and transportation techniques were developed. 
Because the salmon have a "homing" sense and will return to their 
release site at maturity, Oregon Aqua Foods have de facto rights to . 
all those salmon that survive the rigors of ocean life, which include 
both natural phenomena and sport fishermen.
Salmon ranching illustrates an important point about "wildlife 
ranching" that is frequently ignored. Whenever individuals are able 
to establish rights to wild species in order to "cultivate" them for 
marketable products, they concurrently reduce the harvest pressure on
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the remaining wild population that frequently exist as a common pro­
perty resource. Salmon ranchers not only supply salmon for the public 
fishery, they make it less feasible for commercial fishermen to over­
exploit the resource by out-competing them. This is also true for 
alligator, duck, and turtle farming, as well as big game ranching.16 
Laws that have prohibited the marketing and trading of commodities 
from wild species have often had the predictable (from an economic 
point of view) impact of devastating the species they were designed to
17protect.
Another aspect of government policy that influences the cost of 
establishing property rights and the optimal time of production is the 
extensive federal land holdings in the West. These lands often pro­
vide goods from protected areas at zero or near zero prices, thus 
reducing the incentive for private landowners to manage for wildlife, 
recreation, or amenities. It is not surprising that International 
Paper, Boise Cascade Corporation, and St. Regis Paper have wildlife 
management programs on their Eastern lands and no programs on their 
Western lands (see Appendix C). Burlington Northern, which has timber 
land only in the West, also has no intensive wildlife program. Lease 
and fee hunting is quite well-established in the South and the East 
where private land dominates; in the West, it exists on a relatively 
small scale.
Taxes are also an important factor in determining how private 
institutions will protect natural areas. Non-profit conservation 
groups receive tax-exempt status under section 501(C)(3) of the Inter­
nal Revenue Service tax code. This exemption significantly increases
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the potential for conservation groups to secure rights to natural 
environments for preservation purposes.
As mentioned with respect to salmon ranching, technology is 
another factor that influences property rights establishment. Barbed 
wire fencing, for example, dramatically lowered the cost of estab­
lishing rights to the Great Plains and shortened the period of non­
exclusivity. Innovative contractual arrangements can be examined as 
innovations in technology. Leases, for example, offer a way of estab­
lishing rights to fugitive resources at a lower cost than fee simple 
ownership. H and H Hunting Unlimited leased over 200,000 acres of 
central Montana rangeland for hunting from different owners. Such a 
lease is a technological advancement, which allows H and H to estab­
lish hunting rights to contiguous acres of land that they do not own 
(see Appendix C). They are able to capture economies of scale in 
management and policing.
The Diamond-A Cattle Company of New Mexico, a large landowner in 
New Mexico and Texas, has recently purchased a recreation lease on a 
ranch in Colorado, giving them the right to guide hunters, fishermen, 
and sightseers on a piece of property they do not own.-*-® The use of 
the lease significantly reduces the costs of acquiring property rights 
to recreational land. Conservation easements used by non-profit 
organizations to preserve land also represent a cost-decreasing tech­
nological change (see this chapter and Appendix B). While new innova­
tions in contracting are rarely, if ever, examined as a change in 
technology this approach is useful in that it allows one to more 
closely analyze the dynamics of evolving property rights.
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In closing this section, a few notes should be made. Although 
the data displayed in Appendices B and C offer examples of privately 
protected natural environments that follow the theory in Chapter 3, 
caution should be observed when drawing conclusions from such data. 
These examples do not provide a "test" of the theory and should not be 
taken as conclusive evidence. There are, however, a few modest con­
clusions that can be drawn from the data in this chapter. First, the 
private sector can and does protect natural areas when property rights 
are defined, enforced, and transferable. Second, voluntary arrange­
ments (contracts) in the private sector often allow innovative and 
flexible responses to the problems of externality and nonexclusivity. 
Third, government policies can both increase and decrease the incen­
tives for the private protection of natural areas by altering the 
costs of establishing and transferring property rights.
institutional Alternatives
While it is true that private protection of natural environments 
is quite extensive, there is no attempt to state whether or not this 
private protection is socially optimal. Assuming that it is likely to 
be suboptimal (for reasons that include public good characteristics of 
certain natural areas and government activity that reduces incentives 
for private protection), it is appropriate to make a few suggestions 
regarding institutional alterations that might encourage private pro­
tection of natural areas. The goals of these possible institutional 
changes are fourfold; (1) reduction of transaction costs in order to 
encourage the production and trade of valuable goods, (2) internaliza-
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tion of the costs and benefits of economic activity, (3) allowing 
exclusive and transferable rights to valuable resources, and (4)
19minimization of opportunities for rent-seeking in the public sector. 
Below I offer several possible institutional changes that, in varying 
degrees, attempt to foster these goals.
Perhaps the most straightforward alternative is the idea of 
"privatizing" some or all of the publicly owned lands.Bie ra­
tionale for moving public lands toward private ownership is essen­
tially twofold. First, private ownership would minimize the bureau­
cratic inefficiencies described in Chapter 1. Many of these efficien­
cies have resulted in degraded natural environments (see Chapter 1).
(An additional and complementary alternative is the elimination of 
costly government subsidy programs to natural resource developers, 
some of which were described earlier in Chapter One.) Both priva­
tization and the elimination of subsidies could result in an increase 
in the protection of natural areas. A second reason for privatization 
is to increase the efficiency of natural resource utilization.
Economic theory has often shown the efficiency of the private sector 
when property rights to resources are secure and transferable.
The argument for privatization is strongest for those lands 
primarily valued for commodity production; that is, lands where the 
rights to the resources in question are easily defined, enforced, and 
transferee). Timber and range lands fit into this category, and pri­
vatization of such land would likely result in increased efficiency of 
production as well as limiting development to those areas where benefits 
exceed costs. Publicly owned lands valued primarily for wildlife, re-
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creation/ and natural amenities are generally thought to be less 
suitable for private ownership because of the difficuly of estab­
lishing exclusive rights to such resources. However/ privatization 
programs that utlilize such bools as (1) preemption clauses that 
recognize the legitimate/ existing rights of public lands users/ (2) 
compensation packages for those who suffer losses, and (3) publicly 
held covenants (which restrict development) to certain scenic or 
irreplaceable resources21 might be able to protect public values and 
still have the benefits of private sector efficiency.
Another possible alternative is the removal of legal barriers to 
ownership and transfer of certain natural resources. Wildlife and 
water (both instream and underground) are resources characterized by 
significant legal barriers to ownership and transfer. Removal of 
these barriers would create more incentives for private entrepreneurs 
to protect natural areas as well as increase the scope of activity for 
non-profit conservation organizations. Removal of these barriers 
would not necessarily mean that the state would (or should) have to 
relinquish all rights to wildlife, for example. Institutions, how­
ever, could be made to accommodate the efforts of people like Malcolm 
Forbes who wish to establish game preserves in a natural environment. 
They could also be made to accommodate groups like Hie Nature Con­
servancy, who wish to protect water resources for their instream 
values.
Another alternative would be the establishment of public-private 
institutions that create incentives for the private protection of 
natural areas. Many programs along this line are already in existence
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and are often quite successful. The most noticeable area of involve­
ment is the effort by state wildlife agencies to aid private land­
owners in the production and maintenance of wildlife habitat.^ Qne 
interesting approach to land preservation is the Maryland Land Trust, 
a state-funded easement program that works with private landowners in 
much the same way as local private land trusts do.^ Another innova­
tive program is the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) "stewardship" 
program in which private ranchers who lease BLM land are given com­
plete management authority (incentive) subject to review by a board of 
ranchers and agency representatives.^ Regarding wilderness manage­
ment, it has been suggested that "wilderness endowment areas" replace 
the current management framework.^ Management authority would be 
vested in a Congressionally appointed "wilderness endowment board" 
that would be able to allow development of an area if it perceived 
that a net gain in wilderness protection could be achieved through 
purchase of additional areas. All of these institutional changes 
attempt to internalize costs and benefits of natural area protection 
by making the decision maker more responsible with respect to his 
actions.
A final alternative is the infusion of marked-type institutions 
into the public sector. These could include contracting the private 
sector for such land management activities as campground and wilder­
ness maintenance, fire control, timber and range surveys, and recrea­
tion management. Some of these suggestions have already been used by 
certain agencies. Another change involves the extensive use of user 
charges, set at a market clearing price (based on management objec-
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tives regarding resource carrying capacity). Hie user fees would 
accomplish several things. First# they would raise revenue for the 
agency. Second, they would minimize subsidies to the extent that the 
charges cover the opportunity cost of the land use. Third# they would
reduce congestion problems in popular locations. Fourth, they would
disperse demand for natural areas to both the private sector and less 
utilized portions of the public domain. Such charges could be imple­
mented for a variety of activities# ranging from campsite use to 
fishing access to backcountry travel. As always# an equilibrium
pricing system is important for efficiency gains.
Though I have touched on several possibilities for creating 
additional incentives for the private protection of natural environ­
ments, I have by no means exhausted the possibilities. Hie ideas I 
have outlined could be used separately or in innovative combinations.
fimraary and Conclusions
Early in Chapter 1# I stated that the modem# conventional view 
holds that the state must be actively involved in order to protect 
natural environments. The private sector is generally not trusted as 
a protector of natural environments. In direct contradiction of that 
view# I presented evidence that shows that the private sector does# in 
fact# protect a vast amount of natural environments. In addition# I 
presented evidence that government activity has often degraded natural 
areas. The paradigm of the new resource economics# with emphasis on 
the property rights theory# was used as an analytical tool to aid in 
the explanation of this contradictory evidence. Finally# I offered
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some alternative institutional (property rights) arrangements that 
might be utilized to further encourage the private sector to protect 
natural areas.
Although the data base for this paper is limited, there are some 
modest conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. One such 
conclusion is that the private sector (both through profit and non­
profit firms) is protecting natural environments when well-specified 
property rights arrangements exist. In addition, the activity of 
government was shown to be an important factor in determining the cost 
of establishing and transferring rights. Because many natural areas 
have legitimate public good characteristics, government activity that 
increases the cost of protecting these areas is essentially wealth 
destroying. The section that considered "institutional alternatives" 
is an attempt to channel government activity toward that which reduces 
the costs of protecting natural environments. In short, this paper 
suggests that the conventional wisdom regarding the role of the state 
in protecting natural areas is one that overlooks the potential of the 
private sector and overestimates the potential of the public sector.
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APPENDIX A 
THE CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES OF 
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JR.
Source: Nancy Newhall, A Contribution ifag Heritage £f Every
American; The Conservation Activities of John D. Rockefeller, 
Jr. (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1957)
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The Conservation Activities of 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr.
Acadia National Park (Maine)
— gave 2,700 acres of Mount Desert Island to U.S. government for 
parkland
Colonial Williamsburg, Virginia
— allotted funds to aid in the purchase and restoration Of this 
historic city
Forest Hill Park (Cleveland, Ohio)
— gave $10,000 and 266 acres to the city in 1938
Grand Canyon National Park (Arizona)
— gave funds to establish a museum
Grand Teton National Park (Wyoming)
— gave 30,000 acres of the Jackson Hole Basin to U.S.
government to add to park 
— formed Jackson Hole Preserve Inc. in 1940 
— gave $6,000,000 in 1952
Great Smoky Mountains National Park (North Carolina and Tennessee)
— gave 500,000 acres to U.S. government to help establish park 
in 1926; entire park area came fran private funds and private 
land
— gave $5,000,000 from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Manorial
The Hudson Valley (New York)
— gave Fort Tyron Park to New York City in 1930
Mesa Verde National Park (Colorado)
— established in museum in the 1920's
The "Palisades" (New Jersey and New York)
— gave 700 acres and $3,000,000 to Interstate Park Commission to 
preserve a scenic area of tall prisms of traprock on the Hudson 
River
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Redwood National Park (California)
— gave $2,000,000 to the Save-the-Redwoods-League in 1918 for 
the purpose of preserving the redwood forests 
— gave $1,000,000 to buy the South Calavera Grove in 1954
Shenandoah National Park (Virginia)
— contributed and aided the organizational effort to establish 
the park in 1926; the park was entirely dependent upon private 
funds and private land and required $1,200,000 and 193,480 
acres
Virgin Islands National Park (Virgin Islands, Caribbean Sea)
— established in 1959 from land bought by the Jackson Hole 
Preserve Inc.
Yosemite National Park (California)
— gave $1,750,000 in 1928 toward the purchase of more than
15,000 acres of heavily timbered forestland to be added to 
the park
APPENDIX B 
NON-PROFIT CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS 
INVOLVED IN ACQUIRING AND MANAGING LAND
NON-PROFIT CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN ACQUIRING AND MANAGING LAND
Name /Add ress
Sates-Morris Mountain 
Conservation Assn. Maine
Purpose
To preserve and protect a 
beautiful, wild Maine 
beach and promote scientific 
research— open to public 
access for hiking and 
hunt Ini'
Number of 
Members
N/A
Acres
Privately donated easement 
to The Nature Conservancy 
then established association 
to administer land which 
has been leased to Bates 
College Department of 
Biology
See: William C. Dennis
"Private Land and Public 
Amenities"
The Big Sur Land 
Trusc
Carmel, California
Preserve open space along 
the
N/A A,000 protected under 
casement, ownership and
9  era
a  
lease
Buckeye Trail Assn. 
Inc.
Worthington, Ohio
To establish a scenic trail 
linking the four corners, 
of Ohio
N/A Established 900 mile
trail linking public 
and private land (some 
land is owned, some is 
leased)
Chesapeke Bay 
Foundation 
Anapolis, MD
Preserving natural heritage 9,000 (in
of Chesapeke Bay 1531)
Approx. 1,500 owned. 
Approx. 1,100 in 
conservation easements
The Collier County 
Conservancy 
Naples, Florida
Preserving the natural 
environment of Collier 
Country, Florida
N/A Purchased approx. 10,000
acres now included in 
National Parks and 
Seashores
Funds
N/A
Approx. $80,000 
since 1978
Mostly volunteer 
work
Approx. $750,000 
in 19S1
Approx. $3 million 
since 196A
Name/Address Purpose
Connecticut River N/A
Watershed Council, Inc.
Number of
Members
1,500
Ducks Unlimited 
Chicago, Illinois
Preserve and restore 
waterfowl habitat
425,000
E3gle Valley Environ- Preservation of the 
mentalists, Inc. bald e3gie
Apple Rivers, Illinois
1,000+
The Green Mountain 
Club inc.
Montpelier, Vermont
Organized to build 
the Long Trail, a 
footpath that follows 
the crest of the Green 
Mountains from Massachusetts 
to Canada
4,200
Izaak Walton League Organized in 1943 to "help N/A
of American Endowment rebuild outdoor America"
Iowa City, Iowa by acquiring land of
unique natural value.
Land is given to government 
agencies for management
Acres Funds
3,137 acres $250,000 total
revenue in 1980.
See: Terry Anderson,
John Baden, and Richard 
Stroup, "Reports to 
the U.S. Department 
of Interior", February 
1982
2.9 million in Canada $25,033,100 total
(under easement and revenue in 1930
lease)
Approx. 1,700 owned N/A
400 easement
Maintains and protects 
the 430 mile long trail 
system. Footpath com­
pleted in 1931. Also 
operates a system of 70 
shelter huts.
40 percent of the 
land is private: the 
rest is government and 
managed via special 
use permits
Generally assist govern- N/A
nent acquisition by 
loaning funds (by acting 
quickly ex. BWCA mholdings)
Has provided land for Glacier, 
Everglades and Redwood National 
Parks.
Kane/Address
Jackson Hole Land Trust 
Jackson, Wyoming
Purpose
Preserve open land in 
the Jackson Hole Valley
Number of
Members
N/A
Hawk Mountain Sanctuary 
Hawk Mountain, PA
Reserve bird habitat 5,500
Marin Agricultural Land 
Trust
Novato, California
"To secure agricultural 
lands in perpetuity for 
agricultural uses"
N/A
The Mo'nonk Preserve 
New Pultz, New York
A non-profit corporation 
operating a private wildlife 
, preserve
N/A
Montana Land Reliance 
Helena, Montana
Preserving agricultural land N/A
Natural Area Council N/A N/A
Acres Funds
700 acres in’easement. N/A
Use of finding conser­
vation buyers/conser­
vation easements
2,000 acres owned Daily fees for
visitors— 40,000 
visitors annually
Uses conservation N/A
easements to "protect" 
land-, currently have 
5,900 potential acres.
See: "Marin County's
Agricultural Land Trust" 
by J. Tevere MacFadyen 
Country Journal, (Feb.
1983):76-83.
5,400 owned Allow hiking,
climbing— sell day 
permits
21,800 (by conservation N/A
easement)
2,500 acres. Title has N/A
since been transferred 
to the Virginia Outdoors 
Foundation (a state agency) 
for management. See: Anderson
Baden and Stroup "Report to U.S. 
Dept, of Interior"
Name/Address
National Audubon Society 
New York, New York
Purpose
(in part) preserve 
wildlife and natural 
environments
Number of
Members
450,000
Acres
75 wildlife sanctuaries 
Approx. 300,000 acres
Funds
Approx. $20 million 
annually
National Wildlife Fed­
eration
Washington, D.C.
Assists NFWS in pur­
chasing land for 
wildlife refuges
4,600,000 Aided NFWS in acquiring
4,200 acres of wildlife 
habitat
$30,429,946 
in total revenue 
in 1P80
The Nature Conservancy 
Arlington, Virginia
Preservation of ecological 156,000 
diversity
Approx. 2.8 million 
acres owned, also use 
easements, voluntary 
stewardship
$34,000,000 raised 
in 1982
North American Wildlife 
Federation 
Washington, D.C.
To promote and sponsor 
wildlife research
N/A 6,090 acres 
See: Anderson, Baden,
and Stroup "Report to 
U.S. Dept, of Interior"
N/A
The Ottaugauchee Regional 
Land Trust 
Woodstock, Vermont
Protecting productive 
agricultural and forest 
lands
N/A Approx. 10,000 by ownership, N/A 
easement and lease
Peninsula Open Space 
Trust
Menlo Parks, Calif.
Preservation of open space 
in San Mateo and Santa 
Clara counties, California
1,100 Ownership, voluntary
stewardship, creative 
developments and easements. 
Often transfer land to 
public agencies for man­
agement .
N/A
Name/Address
The Ruffed Grouse Society 
Corapolis, Pennsylvania
Save-the-Redwoods League 
San Francisco, California
The Sierra Club 
Foundation
San Francisco, Calif.
Society of Tyinpanuchas 
Cupido Pinnatus Ltd. 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Number of
Purpose Membe rs . Acres
Improving habitat for 10,000 Research, forest
forest wildlife consulting
Preserve Redwood forest Approx. 60,000 230,000 now included
in California Redwood 
state parks, Redwood 
National Park (some 
purchased, some rec­
eived as gifts)
Owns and preserves 
parcels of land in'its 
effort to promote environ- . 
mental quality. Affiliated 
with the Sierra Club. Only 
accepts donations of land; 
does not actively seek 
acouisition
N/A Approximately 1,000
owned, including a 
parcel that contains 
a shelter hut on Me. 
Shasta at the 8,000 
foot level
Dedicated to the 1,200 10,000 acres
preservation of the 
prairie chicken
Funds 
$400,00.0 in 1981
Over $37 million 
since 1918
N/A
Purchase land and 
lease it to state for 
prairie chicken manage­
ment. Allow grazing, 
haying, and other 
activities which do not 
harm the prairie chicken 
population.
Sunny Valley Foundation Preservation of agriculture N/A
New Milford, Conneticut and silviculture in the
Northeastern states
2,000 acres of hiking 
trails, natural areas, 
and agriculture
N/A
Name/Address
The Trust for Public Land 
San Francisco, California
Purpose
Preservation of urban
open space and recreational
lands
Number of
Members
N/A
Acres
84,000 acres have been 
acquired and turned over 
to federal, state, and 
local government agencies 
for management.
See: Anderson, Baden,
and Stroup "Report to 
U.S. Dept, of Interior"
Unexpected Wildlife Refuge 
Newfield, New Jersey
Preserve beaver and N/A
other wildlife habitat
300 owned
United States Ski 
Educational Foundation 
Aspen, Colorado
Operates the Alfred A. Braum 
Hut System, a system of six 
alpine huts located in the 
Aspen-Ashcroft Wilderness 
Area— $5.00/day/person—  
reservations required
N/A N/A
World Wildlife Fund - U.S. 
Washington, D.C.
Wildlife preservation Approx. Has assisted governments
67,000 in purchase of land for
260 parks and preserves
See also 1981 Directory of Local Land Conservation Organization for a list of over. 400 private 
groups
N/A denotes information is unavailable.
Funds
$4,673,831 total 
revenue in 1980
N/A
N/A
Approx. $2 million 
annually ($3,953,505 
in 1981)
land conservation
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Name/Address
Aluminum Company 
of America (ALCOA)
Boise Cascade Corp. 
Boise, Idaho
Burlington Northern 
St. Paul, Minnesota
Business Assets Acres Other
Originally purchased N/A 90,000 acres of N/A
woodland to control timberland
erosion and siltation
in a watershed it
would be using for
hydroelectric power
— Currently ALCOA is 
working with The Ruffed 
Grouse Society to improve 
wildlife habitat on
30,000 acres of the Little 
Tennessee River watershed
Lease hunting on N/A 2,664,000 acres N/A
southeast lands/open 
public access of northeast 
midwest and western lands/ 
maintain a system of 
primitive public camp­
grounds
Forest products industry N/A 1,492,000 -Washington, Idaho.
Open land policy for Montana, Oregon.
dispersed recreation. Has wildlife and
Sells permits for watershed professionals
firewood. Sells on their staff.
guiding rights to
backcountry guides
and outfitters.
Name/Address Business Assets
Burnt Pine Plantation Manage for quail and N/A
Marietta, Georgia deer in a natural
environment/a profit 
seeking hunting preserve
California Land 
Management Services, 
Inc.
Menlo Park, Calif.
Contracts out for security, 
patrol, routine maintenance, 
resource management, and 
interpretive services for 
private and public parks, 
watershed lands, recreational 
facilities and open space 
areas
N/A
Diamond-A Cattle Co. Working cattle operation N/A
Roswell, New Mexico with fee hunting/recreational
lease on Colorado ranch
Eastern Slope Land­
owners Association 
Great Falls, Mont.
Fee hunting on private 
rangeland/wildlife 
consultant hired to 
assist landowners in 
fish and game management
N/A
Eco Realty 
Ovando, Montana
Real estate firm dedi­
cated to maintaining 
environmental qualicy 
in Montana
N/A
Acres Other
Greater than 
14,000 acres of 
Georgia piedmont
-Use prescribed fire 
-Manages for trophy 
whitetailed bucks 
-Hires wildlife 
biologists
N/A -Boasts 20% - 30%
cost saving to 
agencies 
-custom tailored 
contracts
2,000,000 acres N/A
Approx. 250,000 N/A
-Arranges conser- N/A
vation buyers to 
protect natural 
and agricultural 
areas
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Name/Address Business
Gulf Oil Corporation 
Wyoming
Waterfowl habitat pro­
vided by oil refinery 
holding ponds
Forbes Trinchera 
Ranch
Fort Garland, Colo.
Original intent to 
establish a game preserve. 
Now a working ranch with 
fee hunting/protective 
covenants on development/ 
environmental control 
committee
H and K Hunting 
Unlimited 
Grassrange, Mont.
Fee hunting on private 
range/land is leased 
from ranchers/hunters 
are limited and are 
assured of a place to 
hunt
Hopcraft Ranch 
Masai Group Ranch 
Nairobi, Kenya
Wildgame ranching/animals 
are harvested by expert 
marksmen/meat is sold on 
European market
International Paper
Company
Dallas, Texas
Wildlife, recreation and 
aesthetics policy/hunting 
leases/works with The 
Nature Conservancy to 
preserve natural areas
Assets
N/A
Acres
N/A
N/A 180,000 acres -Land is of high 
amenity and recreational 
value. Borders the 
rest of the Sangre 
de Cristo Mountains
N/A 200,000 acres K and H split
revenue with the 
individual land­
owners
N/A 22,000 acres See "Preservation for
96,000 acres Profit” New York Times
Magazine, September 12, 
1982, pp. 50
N/A 8,410,000 acres Largest private
landowner in the 
United States
N>O
Name/Address Business
Kachemak Bay Vacation lodge with
Wilderness Lodge hiking trails ■
Homer, Alaska
Land Improvement 
Contractors of 
America
Maywood, Illinois
Organization of con­
tractors involved in 
land leveling, land- 
clearing, irrigation, 
erosion control, 
pollution .control, 
waste management, 
reclamation and rec­
reational construction
Liccle St. .Simons 
Island
St. Simons Island, 
Georgia
Lone Mountain Ranch 
Big Sky, Montana
Louisiana-Pacific 
Corporation 
Portland, Oregon
Pristine barrier 
island retreat-resort. 
Activities include 
birding, hiking, fishing, 
photography, etc.
Skiing, hiking, fishing, 
packing ranch
Land is generally open 
to public access/some 
campgrounds and picnic 
areas have been constructed
Meadowlark Farms 
Sullivan, Indiana
N/A
Assets
N/A
Acres
N-/A
Other
-Established a 
nonprofit marine 
research and 
education project
N/A N/A N/A
N/A 12,000 acres N/A
N/A Approx. 2,000 acres N/A
N/A N/A N/A
Reclaimed mining 
land for agricultural 
and wildlife uses
N/A See: Carol L. Cornforth,
"Reclamation Commitment 
Proves Rewarding." Coal. 
Mining and Processing 
(March 1973).
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Name/Address Business
Oregon Aqua Foods, 
Inc. (owned by 
Weyer'nauser Company) 
Springfield, Oregon
The Pelican Club 
Carrabelle, Florida
Fines Recreational 
Park
Alturas, California
Potlach Corporation 
San Francisco, Calif.
Private salmon ranching
"An investment in 
tomorrow's salmon 
today"
Resort hotel on Dog 
Island, a 1800-acres 
barrier island off the 
Florida coast. The 
majority of the island 
is owned by The Nature 
Conservancy and main­
tained in a pristine 
condition
Provide remote back- 
country recreation
Opens land to public 
hunting
R-Ranch Private recreation
Jeff Dennis
Siskiyou County, Calif.
Assets
Salmon enter the 
"public" fishery of 
the open ocean where 
they nature
N/A
Acres
Owns hatchery and
return-release
site/facility
1,800 acres
Other
Chinook, coho, and 
chum salmon are raised
See: "Private Salmon
Ranching in Oregon" by 
William J. McNeil,
Farm and Land Realtor, 
November ,1980, pp. 8-11
N/A
Sold over 2800 
private shares
7,000 acres See: "Playground for
a Price" Time, January 
15, 1979, p. A7
. N/A 1.3 million Owns forestland in 
Idaho, Minnesota 
and Arkansas
2500 ownership shares 5,119 acres See: Time, January
were sold ranging from 15, 197 9
$4950 to $9000 per
share/shareowner is
allowed unlimited
recreational use
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Name/Address
Simpson Timber Co. 
Seattle, Washington
Business •
Forest products company
Assets
N/A
Acres
N/A
Other
Donated land to The 
Nature Conservancy on 
Skagit River for a 
bald eagle sanctuary
St. Regis Paper 
Company
New York, New York
"iimberline Recla­
mation. Inc. 
Bozeman, Montana
United Farm Agency 
Kansas City, MO
Wildlife management 
programs (especially 
on their east Texas lands)/ 
public hunting and camping 
allowed/leases to hunting 
clubs/fee fishing/experi­
mental forest preserves/ 
worked with The Nature 
Conservancy to preserve 
natural areas
An environmentally oriented 
multi-disciplinary firm 
providing planning and 
engineering worldwide 
(fishery consultants and 
aquatic services)
Real estate business
N/A 3,179,000 acres N/A
N/A
N/A
-Have been involved 
in a broad range of 
-environmental engin­
eering projects from 
land reclamation to 
acid mine waste 
stabilization
N/A
-Have done stream 
reclamation work 
in 17 states and 
2 foreign countries
-Advertise for 
"wilderness" buyers 
specializing in 
ranch/rural land 
for recreationists
Weyerhauser Company 
Seattle, Washington
Forest products company N/A 5,923,000 acres -Constructed perches 
for bald eagle popu­
lation •
See: Peterson's Hunting, November, 1982, for a directory of private hunting preserves in 42 states.
See: Outside, December, 1982, for a survey of private nordic skiing acres in the United States.
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APPENDIX D 
TERMS OF SALE CONTRACT FOR CROSS RANCH 
LAND OWNED BY THE NATURE CONSERVANCY
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TERMS OF SALE
1. All bids must be in writing and filed with ttic law offices of 
Atkinson, Dwyer & Klemin, P.O. Box 1176, Suite 414, Dakota Northwestern Bank 
Building, 400 F.ast Broadway, Bismarck, North Dakota, on or before 2:00 p.m., 
April 22, 1982. Bids will be opened at 2:00 p.m., April 22, 1982, in the 
conference room in the basement of the Dakota Northwestern Bank Building. . 
Bidders need not be present but may attend. There shall be no right to 
increase the bids orally at the time of sale.
2. Bids may be submitted on any of Parcels I, II, III, IV, V and
VI, or on any combination of parcels. Bids will not be accepted on a per
acre basis.
3. All bids must be accompanied by an earnest money deposit in
the sum of ten percent (10%) of the bid price in the form of a cashiers or
certified check. The deposit will be returned to all unsuccessful bidders 
on the date of sale.
4. Seller reserves the right to reject any or all bids.
5. The balance of the purchase price from all successful bidders
shall be due and payable within thirty (30) days from the date of sale, cr 
as soon thereafter, as any necessary survey work is completed. Seller will 
provide successful bidders with a current abstract of title for buyer's 
examination prior to conveyance of the property.
6. All survey work deemed necessary by the Seller to adequately
define the boundaries of the parcels conveyed shall be done by and at the
expense of the Seller.
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7. Conveyance of the parcels to successful bidders shall be made 
by Warranty Deed, subject to all easements, restrictions, mineral leases, 
mineral reservations, rights-of-way and exceptions of record.
8. Seller reserves all oil, gas, coal, gravel, clay, uranium and 
other minerals, with full right of ingress and egress to search for and 
remove the same.
9. Parcels I, II and III shall be used only for agricultural pur­
poses and such restriction shall be contained in the deeds of conveyance.
10. Parcels IV, V and VI shall be used only for pasture and grazing 
land and shall not be plowed or cultivated. Such restrictions shall be con­
tained in the deeds of conveyance.
11. No residential or commercial structures of any kind shall be 
constructed or placed upon the property conveyed without the express written 
consent of the Seller. Such restriction shall be contained in the deeds of 
conveyance.
12. Seller reserves the right of access for itself or its agents 
to all parcels for purposes of archaeological research, excavation and re­
moval of artifacts, provided such activity does not unreasonably interfere 
with the buyer's agricultural use of the property.
13. Successful bidders shall be required to enter into an agreement 
not to compete with the Seller for the lease on Section 36, Township 143 North, 
Range 82 West for a period of five (5) years from the date of the agreement as 
a condition for the conveyance of the property.
Maps of the parcels and recent title information are available upon 
request. For further information, contact Lawrence R, Klemin, P.O. Box 1176, 
Bismarck, North Dakota 58502. Telelphone (701) 255-2586.
THE WO R D "BID" SHOULD BE CLEARLY A N D  DI S TINCT LY M A R K E D  ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE 
ENVELOPE CONTAINI NG YOUR BID.
APPENDIX E 
EXAMPLE OF A CONSERVATION EASEMENT 
(Courtesy of the Ottauquechee Regional Land Trust)
(Farm and Forest Land Version)
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SAMPLE CONSERVATION AGREEMENT
WARRANTY DEED 
AND
GRANT OF CONSERVATION RESTRICTIONS
WHEREAS,____________________________ is the owner in fee of certuin real
property situated i n _____ _____________,_______________ _______ County,
Vermont, wliich h/is aesthetic, recreational and natural resource values in it3 
present state, as veil as value resulting from its potential future develop­
ment as residential or commercial property, which property has not yet been 
subject to excessive development; and
WHEREAS, thi3 property contains  acres of open land which is presently
in active agricultural use and  acres of forested lands which is under
management for the production of forest products; and
WHEREAS, this property provides habitat for many species of game and 
non-game wildlife, and is used from time to time by members of the public for 
hiking, skiing, hunting, and other types of recreation; and
WHEREAS, the OTTAUQUECHEE REGIONAL LAND TRUST, INC. is a non-profit 
corporation incorporated under the lavs of the State of Vermont whose purpose 
is to preserve undeveloped and open space land in order to protect the 
aesthetic, recreational, cultural, educational, scientific and natural 
resources of the State through non-regulatory means, thereby reducing the 
burdens on local and state governments; and
WHEREAS, the economic health of Vermont is closely linked to its 
agricultural and forest lands, which not only produce food products, fuel, 
timber and other products, but al30 provide much of Vermont's scenic beauty, 
upon which the state's tourist and recreation industries depend; and
WHEREAS, the State of Vermont ha3 repeatedly sought to foster the conser­
vation of the state's agricultural, forest and other natural resources through 
planning, regulation, land acquisition and tax incentive programs, including, 
but not limited to, Title 10 Y.S.A. Chapter 151 (Act 250); Title 24 V.S.A. 
Chapter 117 (Regional and Municipal Planning and Development Act); Title 10 
•V.S.A. Chapter 155 (Acquisition of Rights and Interests in Land); Title 32, 
V.S.A. Chapter 124 (Current Use Taxation), Title 32 V.S.A. Chapter 231. 
(Property Transfer Tax Act); and Title 32 V.S.A. Chapter 235 (Land Cains Tax); 
and
WHEREAS, the parties to this Gront and Agreement recognize the ncenic and 
natural values of the property, and shore the common purpose of conserving 
these values by the conveyance of a conservation restriction and to prevent 
the use or development of the property for any purpose or in any manner which 
would conflict with the maintenance of these scenic and natural values, except
a.<i hereinafter specifically provided; and
WHEREAS, the conservation of thin property as open apace land is consis­
tent with'and in furtherance of the municipal plan adopted by the Town 
of   and the regional plan adopted b y _____________ ;
HOW, THEREFORE, 138
KNOW ALL PERSON BY THESE PRESENTS Hint _      of the
Tovn o f _______________ , ______________ County, Vermont, on Behalf of them­
selves, their heirs, successors and assigns (hereinafter "Grantors"), in 
consideration of the agreement of Crautoe to accept and enforce in perpetuity 
the conservation restrictions contained .herein, and .the payment of One Dollar 
and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of vhich is hereby 
acknowledged, hereby grant,'sell, give, and convey unto the OTTAUQUECHEE 
REGIONAL LAND TRUST, INC., a Vermont non-profit corporation organized and 
existing under the lava of the State of Vermont, having its principal place of 
business in Woodstock, Vermont, its successors and assigns (hereinafter
"Grantee"), a certain parcel of land lying and being in, __________________
County, State of Vermont (hereinafter referred to as "Parcel A", in fee simple 
absolute, free from all encumbrances except those rights and restrictions 
further reserved herein to the Grantors, such Parcel A being described as 
follows:
A __________ -shaped parcel of land containing acres, more or
less, vhich is part of the land and premises conveyed to Crantors by
Warranty deed of ■  ■_____ doted ________
_______ , recorded at Book _____ , Page   of the     Land
Records, to which deed, and the deeds and plans referred to therein, 
reference may be had for a more complete description. A further descrip­
tion may he had by reference to a survey map prepared by _________________
_________ , dated _______________ , entitled_______________________________
______________________ , and recorded simultaneously herewith, at Book ___,
Page _____  of the   Land Records, such  -shaped parcel being
designated as Parcel A upon such survey map. This conveyance is made to­
gether with the right of access over and across Parcel B, so identified 
upon the above-described survey map, the exact location of such access to 
be determined from time to time by the Grantors at a location providing 
reasonable ingress and egress to the Grantee, its successors and assigns.. 
Such right of access shall constitute an appurtenance to said Parcel A, 
and shall run with the land in perpetuity.
The said Parcel A is conveyed together with-the appurtenant benefit of a 
perpetual conservation easement and restriction (as more particularly set 
forth below) across certain other lands of Grantors (hereinafter referred to 
"Parcel B" or "Protected Property") contiguous with the land3 conveyed in fee 
to Grantee hereunder, said Parcel B being more particularly described as 
follows:
A __________ -shaped parcel of land containing _______  acres, more
or less, which is part of the land and premises conveyed to Grantors by
Warranty Deed of ________________ .________________________, dated_________
, recorded at Book _______ , Page of the
Land Records, to which deed, and the deeds and plans referred to therein, 
reference may be had for a more particular description. A further 
description may be had by reference to the survey map prepared by
___________________________dated •______ __ , entitled
_  _____________     and recorded simultaneously herein at Book ,
Page ___ of the       I.nnd Records, such -shaped
parcel being designated as Parcel B under such survey roup.
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The righto grunted to Grnntco consint of covenantn on the part of the 
Grnntoro to do or refrain from doing, nevcrally and collectively, the vurioua 
acta net forth belov. It in hereby agreed that theac covenant:) shall 
constitute a servitude upon the land and will. be for the benefit of the 
Crnntce which ac.ceptn and agrees to enforco ouch covenants on behalf and for 
the benefit of the general public, through the preservation of wildlife 
habitats', non-commercial recreational opportunities and activities, productive 
agricultural and forestry uses, and other natural and ocenic valuea of tho 
Protected Property for present and future generations,
THE RESTRICTIONS hereby imposed upon the above described Property, and 
the acts which Grantors shall do-or refrain from doing, are follows:
1. The Protected Property 3hall be used for agriculture, forestry, 
non-commerical recreation, and open space purposes only. No residential, 
commercial, industrial, or mining activities 3hall be permitted, and no 
building or structure shall be constructed, created, erected or moved onto the 
property, except 83 specifically reserved by the Grantors under this Grant.
2 . No rights-of-way, easements of ingress or egress, driveways-, roads, 
or utility lines shall be constructed, developed or maintained into, on, over, 
under or across the property, except as specifically reserved by the Grantors 
under this Grant.
3* There shall be no signs, billboards, or outdoor advertising of any 
kind erected or displayed; provided, however, that the Grantors may erect and. 
maintain reasonable boundary markers, directional signs, signs restricting 
hunting or trespassing on the property, memorial plaques, and temporary signs 
indicating that the property is for sale or lease. In addition, small signs 
informing the public if any agricultural or timber products for sale or being 
grown on the premises are permitted. Grantee, with the permission of 
Grantors, may erect and maintain signs designating the property as land under 
the protection of the Grantee.
4* The placement, collection or storage of trash, ashes, human and 
agricultural waste, sawdust, vehicles or equipment, or any unsightly or 
offensive material on the property shall not be permitted except at such 
locations, if any, and in such a manner 03 shall be approved in advance in 
writing by Grantee. The'spreading of manure, lime, or other fertilizer for 
agricultural practices shall he permitted without such prior written approval.
5. There shall be no disturbance of the surface, including but not 
limited to filling, excavation, removal of topsoil, sand, gravel, rocks or 
minerals, or change of the topography of the land in any manner, except us may 
bo reasonably necessary to carry out the uses permitted on the Protected 
Property under the terms of this Agreement, provided that in no case 3boll 
surface mining of subsurface oil, gas or other minerals be permitted.
6. The Protected Property shall not be subdivided.
7. No use shall be made of the premises, and no activity thereon shall 
be permitted which, in the reasonable opinion of the Grantee, is or may 
possess the potential to become inconsistent with the intent of this grant, 
such intent being the prcservaton of the premises predominantly in its natural
I'll)
condition, the protection of cnviroiunentnl systems, the protection of the 
property's acenic benuty, and the encouragement of the sound utilization and 
conservation of agricultural and forent resources.
NOTWITHSTANDING THE POREGOINC, Grantors reserve the following rights in 
the Protected Property:
1. The right to establish, reestablish, maintain and use cultivated 
fields, orchards, and pastures in accordance with generally accepted agri­
cultural practices and sound husbandry principles.
2. The right to conduct maple sugaring operations in accordance with 
generally accepted practices.
2* The right to harvest timber and other vood products, together with 
the right to construct and maintain logging roads necessary to effect such 
harvest, in accordance vith generally ucceptcd forestry practices and in 
accordance vith a forest management plan for vhich Grantor has received the 
prior vritten approval of Crantee, eicept that Grantors may harvest firewood 
for heating residences and structures located on the Protected Property 
without submission and approval of a plan. Grantee's approval of forest 
management plnn3 that may bo submitted from time to time shall not bo 
unreasonably withhold or conditioned, if such plans have been approved by a 
professional forester and if such plans do not violate the terms of this 
Agreement. Disapproval by Grantee of a forest management plan proposing a 
clearcut (removal of more than 15% of the basal area) shall not be deemed 
unreasonable. However, Grantee may approve such plan in its discretion if 
consistent vith the purposes of this Agreement, such as to permit the planting 
of a different species of trees or the establishment or reestablishment of a 
field, pasture or garden.
4. The right to utilize, maintain, establish, construct and improve 
water sources, courses, and bodies within the Protected Property for U3es 
otherwise permitted hereunder, provided that Grantors do not unnecessarily 
disturb the natural course of the surface water drainage and runoff flowing 
over the property. The construction of ponds or reservoirs shall be permitted 
only upon the prior written approval of Grantee. Such approval shall not be 
unreasonably withheld or conditioned, unless such construction would conflict 
with an important purpose of this Agreement, such as the protection of a 
natural resource or wildlife habitat.
5. The right to clear, construct, and maintain trails for walking, 
horseback riding, skiing, and other non-motorized recreational activities 
within and across the Protected Property, eicept that snowmobile travel shall 
also be permitted.
IT IS HEREBY AGREED that the construction of any buildings, strictures or 
improvements, or any use of the land, otherwise penaitted under this Agree­
ment, shall be in accordance with all applicable ordinances, statutes and 
regulations of the Town o f ___________ _____and the State of Vermont.
CRANTEE shall make reasonable efforts from time to time to assure com­
pliance by Grantors with all of the covenunts and restrictions herein. In 
connection with such efforts, Grantee may make periodic inspection of all or 
any portion of the Protected Property, and for such inspection and enforcement 
purposes, the Grantee shall have tlie right of reasonable access to all of
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Parcel B. In the event that Crantee becomes aware of an event or circuinntance 
of non-complionce with the terms and conditions herein aet forth, Crantee 
shall give notice to Grantors of such event or circumstance of non-compliance 
via certified mail, return receipt requested, and demand corrective action 
sufficient to abate such event or circumstance of non-complinnco and restore 
the Protected Property to its previous condition. Failure by the Grantors to 
cause discontinuance, abatement or such other corrective action as may be 
demanded by Grantee within 40 hours after rcccipto of notico shall entitle 
Crantee to bring an action in a court of competent jurisdicton to enforce the 
terns of this Agreement nnd to recover, any damages arising from such non- 
compliance. Such damages, when recovered, may be applied by Grantee to 
corrective action on the Protected Property, if necessary. If such Court 
determines that Grantors have failed to comply with this Agreement, Grantors 
shall reimburse Grantee for any reasonable costs of enforcement, including 
court costa and reasonable attorneys fees, in addition to any o.ther payments 
ordered by such Court. The parties to tlds Grant specifically acknowledge 
that events and circumstances of non-compliance constitute immediate and 
irreparable injury, loss and damage to the Protected Property and, accord­
ingly, entitle Crantee to such equitable relief, including but not limited to 
injunctive relief, as the Court deems ju3t. The remedies described herein are 
in addition to, and not in limitation of, any other remedies available to 
Grantee at law, in equity or through administrative proceedings.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that Grantors reserve to the benefit of Prrcol B con­
servation easements and restrictions encumbering Parcel A, such reserved 
easements and restrictions to be the same as those conveyed to Grantee herein 
encumbering Parcel B, and to be appurtenant to Parcel B, permanent and per­
petual, and running with the land. Grantee hereby agrees that those persons 
owning Parcel B from time to time shull have the use and enjoyment of Parcel 
A, to the extent that such possession, use and enjoyment are not inconsistent 
with the rights and obligations, easements, and restrictions convoyed to the 
Crantee by this deed.
The Grantors shall pay all real estate taxes and assessments levied by 
competent authorities against the Protected Property, as well as against 
Parcel A, and shall hold Granteee harmless from the same.
INVALIDATION of any provision hereof shall not affect any other provision
of this Agreement.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said granted premises, with all the privileges and 
appurtenances thereof, to the said Gruntee, OTTAUQUECHEE REGIONAL LAND TRUST, 
INC., its successors and assigns, to their own use and behoof forever; and we
the said Grantors, ___________________ .________________ for ourselves and our
heirs, executors and administrators, do covenant with the said "Grantee, 
OTTAUQUECHEE REGIONAL LAND TRUST, INC., it3 successors nnd assigns, that until 
the ensealing of these presents we are the sole owners of the premises, and 
have good right nnd title to convey the same in the munner uforcsaid, that
they arc free from every encumbrance, nnd wo hereby engage to warrant and
defend the same against all lawful claims whatever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we set our handB and seals thin  day
of , 198 .
Signed, sealed nnd dcliverod in 
the presence of: CRANTORS:
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Vitnose to Both
Witness to Both
___________________________  GRANTEE:
Witness
OTTAUQUECHEE REGIONAL LAND TRUST, 
INC.
Vitneaa By:___________________________
Its Duly Authorized Agent
STATE OF VERMONT 
VIHDSOR COUNTY, ss.
At ___ , Vermont, this______  day o f _____________, 1S8_,
_____________________ _______________________________ personally appeared and
acknowledged this instrument, by ________  sealed and subscribed, to
b e _________  free act and deed.
Before me,
Notary Public
STATE OF VERMONT 
WINDSOR COUNTY, os.
At ________________ _« Vermont, this _____  day of  , 198_,
_______________ , duly authorized officer of the Ottauquechee
Regional Land Trust, Inc., personally appeared and _____  acknowledged this
instrument, by . scaled and subscribed to be ____  free act and deed nnd
the free act and deed of the Ottauquechee Regional Land Trust, Inc.
Beforo me,
Notary Public
Source:
APPENDIX F
EXAMPLE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS DESIGNED TO 
PROTECT NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for 
Forbes Park, Costilla County, Colorado, pp. 8,9.
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ARTICIE VIII 
PROTECTIVE COVENANTS
The following restrictions, conditions and covenants, collectively cal^d "Protective Covenants", are imposed upon all lltc  Lots, Condominium Units wliere 
applicable, and Common Areas without limiting or altering Hie provisions ol Article VII
(a) Any tank lor tlie storage ol gas or liquid shall be hidden horn Hie view ol oilier lo ts  and llie  Common Area,
(b) No kennel or other facility lor raising or hoarding dogs or otiier animals lor commercial purposes shall be kept in Forties Park No animals ol any 
kind shall be raised, bred or kept in f orbes Park except reasonable numbers o! dogs, cats or other ordinary household pets. No poultry may he kept in 
Forbes Park No dog shall be allowed to run loose except when accompanied by a peison capable of keeping such dog under surveillance and control.
(c) All relure, rubbish, trash, garbage or waste shall be kept disposed of or removed in a sanitary manner. All household refuse and rubbish, trash, 
garbage or waste shall be kept in closed containers inside a building or other approved enclosure until taken, to a disposal place operated or licensed 
by the proper public authonty lor such disposal. Nonhoutehold retuse, rubbish, (rash, garbage, or waste, oilier than dead leaves and fallen limbs shall 
not be permitted to remain exposed on a Lol
. (d) Any veh.cle, whether selfpropelted or not permitted to remain on any Lol or Common Area shall be kept in a licensed and operable condition. Any 
vehicle, whether sclfpropefed or ncL shall be parked m such a manner that it is not a nuisance, aesthetically or olher.vise. to other Mernbere. A truck 
larger than three-quarter (3 /4) ton rating shall only be kept on a Lot inside an approved ouilcfing except during any period ol authorized construction. A 
vehicle shall not be parked on that part c l any road normally used by vehicles being dnven on such road. The provisions ol this paragraph shall not 
apply to Declarant during time of construction ol roads.
(e) Noxious, obnoxious, nosy, unsightly or otherwise offensive objects or activities, specifically including vehicle repairs, barking dogs and littering 
shall npl be permitted nor shall anything be permitted that may be an unreasonable annoyance or nuisance to other Owners.
(I) A professional quality sign of not more than four (4) square feet in area shall be allowed to be displayed on a Lot for any purpose and one (1) 
additional sign of not more than four (4) square feet in area shall be allowed to be displayed lor advertising such Lot or improvement thereon for sale, 
lease or renl
(g) A structure of a temporary or mob!'.’ nature, motorhome. mobile home, camper ti uck travel trailer, camping tiailer, oilier vehicle used or designed lor 
camping, or tent, shall not be pla ixd on a Lot lor more tlu n  three (3) consecutive nights and days more than once each calendar month except that tlie 
Committee may grant a permit (1) (or any of the above to be placed on a lo t  and used for longer periods ol lime during construction of a dwelling 
diligently pursued, or, (2) for vacation camping under the conditions and procedures provided in Article VII liereof. Subject lo the prior wirttun approval 
of Declarant, with respect to the real property described in Exhibit C, the Board may designate a part of the Common Area as a Storage area for all 
vehicles that are prohibited from being placed on a LoL
(h) All septic systems operated with water from wells drilled under permits obtained pursuant to the Decree of the District Court in and for Water 
Division No. 3, State of Colorado, Case No. W-3312. shall be limited to sewage disposed of by septic tank and absoi|rtiori fields, the eflluent of which shall 
return to groundwater in the drainage basins in which such wells are located. Said absorption fields and septic lank installations shall be constructed in 
conformance with the standards and requirements of state and county health authorities. Nowithstanding the foregoing requirements, the Committee 
may approve an evaporative field septic system il the construction of a septic tank and absorption field would cause a hardship in any particular situa­
tion and if the Committee is permitted to do so under a modification of the Decree in Case No. W-3312.
(i) Any outdoor fire shall be made in a facility or a receptacle having a properiy operating spark screen. All fireplaces whether inside a building or out­
doors shalll have an operational approved spark scfeen covering the top cf ttie chimney. Any condition which creates a fire hazard shall not be per­
mitted on a Lol
6) No single-family residence or Condominium U n it exclusive of open porches, garages and carports, shall be less than six hundred (500) square 
feet in main floor area. No more than one (1) single-family residence plus appropriate ancillary buildings may hie erected on a Lot nol designated a Com­
mercial LoL No commune, cooperative or similar type living arrangement shall be permitted a nyw k ’ re in Forbes Park
(k) All water derived from wells permitted by the State Engineer of the State of Colorado pursuant to tlie previsions of the Decree of the District Court 
in and for Water Division No. 3, State of Colorado, in Case No. W-3312, shall be used for domestic in-house use only.
(I) No commercial enterprise shall be operated other than on a Commercial Lot.
(m) Building matenals shall not be placed on a lo t nor shall foundation work be skirted for any Improvement unless such Improvement lias previous­
ly been approved by Hie Committee. Once approval is otitaincd, such Improvement must be completed within twelve (12) months after building mate- • 
rials are first placed on such Lot or foundation work ts begun.
(n) A wire fence shall nol be permitted on a Lot except one such fence enclosing nol more than 1600 square feet for Hie purpose of enclosing house­
hold pets.
(o) Hunting sh3ll not be permitted.
(p) Firearms, explosives, fireworks or arrows shall not be used, shot or discharged except in such areas as may be designated by the Association for 
such use, shooting or discharging
(q) Explosives shall not be used tor construction purposes unless such use has been approved by tlie Committee.
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(r) Excessively noisy vehicles o! any kind, a ll terrain vehicles, tra il-b ite , helicopters, aircraft or motorcycles shall not be tised anywhere in fo rte s  Park.
(s) Chain saws sJialt not be used without a proper spark arrester on the exhaust and chain saws or other noisy equipment shall not be operated before
800  A id . or after 5:00 PM.
(I) All tctepfxne, etedricel power, and t f te r  receiving! or transmission lines shall be [taced unckerpj cHiisd except that such lines on poles shall be per­
mitted (1) in the case ol major lines to a,mas of Forbes Park as Declarant dooms appropriate and (?) wlx-re tire Committee determines underground lines 
are umeasonaWy expensne or otherwise impractical.
(u) Existing tree lines on all Lots and Commercial Lots shall not be disturbed or altered and, wlierevcr practicable, all improvements shall be placed a 
reasonable distance behind such tree lines as determined by the'Committee.
(v) Any tree having a diameter at the base greater than four (4) inches shall not be cut down without pnor approval of the Committee.
(w) A lo t  sfiall not be subdivided or partially teased except a Commercial Lot owned by Declarant
(x) Snowmobiles shal< not be operated except in transit to or from such parts of tlie Common Areas as the Association and Declarant may from time 
tq time designate as snow mo tiling  areas.
(y) Any vehicle requiring its operator to have an operator's license under the laws of the State ol Colorado shall be operated only by a person having a 
valid operator’s license.
(?) All improvements shaft be maintained in such a manner t lu t  tliey do not become (1) unsightly, (?) in disrepair, (3| unsanitary or (4) a fire hazard.
(aa) No guest house, garage, carport or other outbuilding shall be constructed on any L d  until afier commencement of construction ol the dwelling 
house on the same lo l
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